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Voice for the Voiceless:
The Case for Adopting the “Domestic Abuse Syndrome” for Self Defense Purposes for All Victims of Domestic
Violence Who Kill Their Abusers
By &ancy Wright

Introduction

Every year, millions of American women and children suffer domestic abuse at the hands of their partners, spouses, parents or
guardians.1 Every day, nearly 2,500 children are abused or neglected.2 As many as 8.8 million children under the age of seventeen sustain severe physical abuse inflicted by their parents or guardians.3
Many of these battered children also suffer from sexual and psychological abuse.4 Some experts estimate that a child will be abused in
some manner in America every ten seconds.5 Indeed, "an additional 3.3 million children are traumatized as indirect victims of domestic abuse, by witnessing the physical violence perpetrated against
their siblings or between their parents.”6
Unfortunately, there has been a steady increase in the number of children who die from domestic abuse at the hands of their
parents. In 1989, approximately 600 children were killed by their
parents.7 By 1995, almost twice as many children (or 1,000 youngsters annually) died of domestic abuse.8 By 2004, there were
almost 1,500 deaths annually from child abuse, an average of more
than four children each day.9 Unfortunately, many experts believe
that these shocking figures are conservative since death from
parental abuse may be incorrectly diagnosed as accidental or as the
result of sudden infant death syndrome.10
The incidence of domestic violence against women is also
shockingly high. According to the Kansas Supreme Court in State v.
Hundley, the physical abuse of women is “extremely widespread”
with the court “estimating that it affects between four and forty million women.”11 In fact, the American Medical Association estimates that “one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically
assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime.”12
Moreover, according to the Wyoming Supreme Court in
Witt v. State, battered women frequently suffer other forms of abuse
as well, such as “humiliation, denial of power, name calling, sexual abuse, threats of violence, and deprivation of food, sleep, heat,
shelter and/or money.”13 In addition, 30% of domestic violence
incidents involve the use of a weapon and the injuries that battered
women receive are at least as severe as those suffered in 90% of
violent felonies.14 In fact, each year approximately two million of
these women suffer severe beatings at the hands of their spouses or
partners.15 Unfortunately, over three women every day are murdered by their husbands;16 frequently experiencing “prolonged,
brutal deaths after years of violence.”17
The women and children who are domestically abused by
their spouses or parents are among the most marginalized members
of American society, trapped in abusive relationships from which
they can see no escape. They are often trapped by their abusers, who
isolate them from family and friends who might otherwise provide
them with assistance and support in leaving. They are frequently
trapped by poverty, making retreat from the abusive situation a
financial impossibility. And they are virtually always trapped by the
unremitting violence, which not only batters them physically but
emotionally as well, making leaving the abusive situation a psychologically unrealistic option.
Faced with the inevitable prospect of escalating physical
violence, often accompanied by sexual and psychological abuse,
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some of these women and children decide that the only escape from
their imprisonment is to kill their abusers. Every year, almost 500
battered women murder their abusive spouses or partners.18
Although less frequent, studies show that about 2% of all homicides
in the nation, or approximately 400 killings each year, are committed by children against their parents.19 Although not all of these
homicides are committed by children who have suffered domestic
violence, according to some estimates, more than 90% of the children who commit parricide have been abused by the parent.20 In
situations like these, the tables are turned, and it is the battered
women or children who decide that the only way out of their agony
is to kill their abusers.
When victims of domestic abuse are charged with the murder of their abusers, they frequently claim that they acted in selfdefense. Attorneys for these victims of domestic abuse ask courts to
admit expert testimony regarding various “syndromes” to describe
the devastating psychological impact of a lifetime of severe physical, sexual and psychological violence, as part of the self-defense
plea. These various syndromes, detailed below, are referred to collectively in this article as “domestic abuse syndrome” (or DAS)
whether the victim is a battered woman or a battered child. Without
the opportunity to present this expert testimony, victims of domestic abuse syndrome will not be able to demonstrate to the jury the
reasonableness of their perceptions of imminent danger or the concomitant reasonableness of their use of lethal force to defend themselves. Unless all victims of domestic abuse syndrome are able to
present this evidence, it is likely that their already broken lives will
be completely shattered by a murder conviction, and they will once
again find themselves trapped with no ability to escape; only this
time it will be in a prison cell.
Overview of the Development of Self-Defense Pleas Based on
Domestic Abuse Syndrome

Abused women were the first to successfully offer expert
testimony regarding the psychological impact of domestic abuse
through the “battered woman’s syndrome” (or BWS).21 Courts
have, for the most part, been willing to admit expert testimony
regarding battered woman’s syndrome22 and have expanded the
syndrome to encompass not only women, but also men (more precisely known as “battered spouse syndrome” or “battered husband’s
syndrome”).23 More recently, the syndrome has been found to
describe not only the impact of domestic abuse in heterosexual relationships, but also the effects of domestic abuse in lesbian and gay
unions (which might be more precisely called “battered partners’
syndrome”).24
Following the lead of attorneys offering expert testimony
regarding the effects of domestic abuse on adult victims, lawyers
representing children, who have killed their abusive parents, have
tried to introduce expert testimony regarding the impact of domestic abuse on child victims as part of a self-defense plea.25 In the
case of physical abuse, attorneys have proffered expert testimony
regarding “battered child syndrome” (or BCS) to describe the psychological effects on the child as part of a self-defense plea.26
Medical evidence of BCS has long been admissible in dependency
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hearings to remove children from abusive homes and in criminal trials to prosecute the abusive parents.27 However, as used in those
cases, BCS referred only to severe abuse of infants or very young
children, usually under the age of five.28 Use of the same term
“battered child syndrome” as part of a self-defense plea for parricide is, therefore, clearly a misnomer and has led to considerable
confusion, since obviously, very young children are not capable of
killing their abusers. Thus, the psychological effects of physical,
sexual and psychological abuse of children who are old enough to
kill their abusers might more appropriately be termed “battered
child syndrome of an older child.”
Whatever term is used, courts have been far more reluctant
to allow expert testimony regarding the psychological effects of battering on children than on adults as part of a self-defense plea.29
This reluctance is hard to understand since BWS (and its various
iterations) and BCS of an older child are the functional and psychological equivalents of each other.30 Therefore, there seems to be little basis for courts to deny battered children the right to present
expert testimony regarding their abuse to help the jury understand
why, like battered adults, abused children could be justified in
killing their abusers based on self-defense. The same logic also supports the admission of expert testimony regarding the very similar
psychological impact on children of intra-familial sexual abuse.31
Moreover, modern research has shown that children who are indirect victims of domestic abuse, by witnessing the physical or sexual abuse of their parent or siblings (which might be called “witness
of abuse syndrome”) also suffer from the same psychological
effects as direct victims.32 Although studies of the psychological
effects of witnessing abuse are more limited, it seems clear that over
time courts will also begin to admit expert testimony regarding this
form of domestic abuse.
This article suggests that rather than being faced with this
bewildering array of psychologically similar syndromes, expert testimony regarding the psychological impact on all victims of severe
domestic violence should be encompassed under a single new term,
the “domestic abuse syndrome” (DAS), and expert testimony
regarding the psychological effects of DAS should be admissible as
part of a self-defense plea when any of these adult or child victims
of domestic violence kill their abusers. Although, for clarity, the
article will discuss only women who are battered by their husbands
or boyfriends in a heterosexual relationship when considering DAS
as applied to adults, it is clear that the same analysis would also
apply to men who are battered by their female spouses or girlfriends
as well as to gays or lesbians who are battered by their partners.
As the New York court noted in recognizing a “battered syndrome”
in People v. Colby, where a father killed his adult son, “[i]f the
claimed elements of being battered are the same regardless of the
relationship between the parties or their gender then there is no reason to limit admissibility of expert testimony in a battered syndrome case to only women and children.”33
Although this article recommends that expert testimony
regarding all of these various victims of domestic violence be subsumed under the new rubric of “domestic abuse syndrome”, it
should be clear that this suggestion is not an attempt to increase the
number of syndromes. Rather it is an effort to decrease the number
of syndromes by combining under one “term” all persons subject to
the same psychological impact from domestic abuse. Instead of
using numerous, confusing syndromes to describe battered adults
and children, courts will be able to rely on only one syndrome to
encompass all of the victims of severe domestic abuse. Combining
all of the current syndromes into one will also help address the concerns of the Texas Court of Appeals in Werner v. State, regarding the
proliferation “syndromes” proffered in an effort to explain, miti-
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gate, justify or excuse a defendant’s criminal conduct.34 In refusing to admit evidence of the “Holocaust Syndrome” to show the
defendant’s state of mind, the Werner court warned: “Psychological
imperfections affect everyone to one degree or another.
Adroit defense counsel can construct these failings into pretexts to
explain any type of unlawful behavior. No line can possibly be
drawn on which syndromes are admissible.”35 The Werner court
expressed concern that so many syndromes have already been
defined that soon an “Appellate Court Judge Syndrome will be
identified.”36 Creation of a single domestic abuse syndrome would
decrease the number of separate syndromes that courts and juries
grapple with when reaching a decision.
Article Overview
Part I of this article first demonstrates that both women and
children who are victims of DAS suffer from the same types of
domestic abuse, including physical, sexual and psychological maltreatment. Part I then delineates the marked similarities between
the psychological impact of domestic abuse on an adult victim,
based on battered woman’s syndrome, and domestic abuse on a
child victim, based on battered child syndrome. Part I also
describes the frequency and debilitating effects of poverty, suffered
by many women and children who are victims of DAS. Part I concludes with the observation that the almost universal admissibility
of expert testimony regarding domestic abuse based on battered
woman’s syndrome should mandate that courts also admit expert
testimony regarding battered child’s syndrome.
Part II explains that expert testimony regarding the psychological impact of DAS, whether offered by a woman as battered
woman’s syndrome or by a child as battered child’s syndrome,
meets the legal requirements for admissibility as part of a selfdefense plea. In both cases the expert testimony is relevant and reliable. Moreover, the psychological effects of domestic abuse syndrome on both women and children are sufficiently beyond the
common experience of the jury, such that expert testimony becomes
necessary. The high probative value of testimony is not outweighed
by any potential prejudicial effect on the jury.
Finally, Part III discusses necessary legal standards
required for meaningful expert testimony in the self-defense pleas
of both adult and child victims of domestic violence who kill their
abusers in non-confrontational settings. It is essential that courts
apply a hybrid (objective-subjective) standard in determining
whether self-defense was reasonable so that the jury can fully consider the unique psychological perspective of a victim of DAS.
Furthermore, it is crucial that trial courts apply a broad time frame
in determining whether the threat of grievous harm was “imminent”
or “immediate” so that the jury will be able to fully consider the
unique ability of a victim of domestic violence to predict when
future abuse will occur.
Admitting Expert Testimony Regarding The Domestic Abuse
Syndrome As Part of a Self-Defense Plea For All Victims of
Domestic Violence
OVERVIEW
The background of the development of battered woman’s
syndrome and battered child syndrome, the key syndromes underlying domestic abuse syndrome, establishes that both women and
children have historically been largely unprotected from the domestic violence they endured. Although some treatment of abused children was available in the late 1800s, it was only forty-five years ago
that pediatricians came to realize that some infants and young children, who they thought were suffering horrendous injuries acciden-
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tally, were in fact being abused by parents or guardians and coined
the term “battered child syndrome” to describe this type of physical
abuse. It was only twenty-eight years ago that psychologist Lenore
Walker coined the term battered woman’s syndrome to describe the
characteristic psychological impact of prolonged domestic abuse on
adult women.
The abuse suffered by both adult women and children,
who are victims of DAS, can be divided into three main categories:
physical injury, sexual abuse and psychological maltreatment.
Whichever types of domestic violence are suffered by the abused
women or children, the battering follows a cyclical pattern consisting of three phases: tension building, acute explosion and loving
contrition. The psychological impact of domestic abuse is the same
on all of the victims of DAS. Both women and children display
“hypervigilance” in monitoring the abuse and “learned helplessness” in trying, usually unsuccessfully, to cope with the battering.
Moreover, many of the women and children who are victims of
DAS are impoverished, which exacerbates the psychological effects
of their abuse.
Although both women and children sustain the same types
of abuse, suffer virtually identical psychological effects from the
battering, and are often similarly impoverished, most courts still do
not allow expert testimony regarding BCS as part of a child’s self
defense plea for parricide. Furthermore, the courts will not allow
the testimony even though they do allow expert testimony regarding BWS as part of a women’s self defense plea when she kills her
abusive husband or boyfriend. This almost incomprehensible legal
anomaly must be rectified so that all victims of DAS have an equal
opportunity to present expert testimony regarding their suffering as
part of a self-defense plea.
The Similarities of the Domestic Abuse Suffered By Women
and Children Victims of Domestic Abuse Syndrome
Domestic Abuse Suffered By Victims Of Battered Woman’s
Syndrome: Historical Development of Battered Woman’s
Syndrome
In State v. Burtzlaff the South Dakota Supreme Court
pointed out that “[h]istorically, women have been unprotected from
violence by laws and custom.”37 In reaching this conclusion, the
court explained that, under English common law, the theory of
coverture made it impossible for a man to be punished for mistreatment of his wife, since the husband and wife were considered to be
a single legal entity.38 The wife was considered to be the husband’s
personal property and “wife beating was an accepted practice.”39
The “Rule of Thumb” allowed a man to beat his wife as long as the
implement he used was “no thicker than his thumb.”40 Since she
was a “chattel, or a servant, who owed her service to her master, her
husband . . . she could not sue for any injuries sustained by her, as
an individual.”41 Even in more modern times, “domestic violence
was considered a family matter where law enforcement and the
courts had no business.”42
A major breakthrough in the understanding and treatment
of female victims of domestic violence occurred in 1979, when psychologist Lenore Walker wrote her seminal book, The Battered
Woman.43 Dr. Walker coined the term “battered woman syndrome”
to describe abusive adult relationships and the psychological effects
of prolonged abuse on the victims.44
Types of Domestic Abuse Suffered by Victims of Battered Woman’s
Syndrome
According to Dr. Walker, a woman is a victim of battered
woman’s syndrome (and would, therefore, be a victim of domestic
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abuse syndrome), if she has been subjected to either physical, sexual or serious psychological abuse, on at least two occasions, by a
man with whom she has an intimate relationship.45 Unfortunately, most victims of BWS are not subjected to just one of these
types of abuse on just two occasions; rather, many battered women
suffer from two or three of the categories of abuse delineated by Dr.
Walker, often on multiple occasions.46 For example, the wife in
State v. Koss not only suffered psychological damage when her husband repeatedly threatened to kill her but also suffered physical
injuries when her husband actually tried to kill her.47 On one occasion her husband tried to smother her with a pillow and on another,
he put a radio in the bathtub while she was taking a bath.48
Ultimately, she killed him before he succeeded in killing her.49
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, Nelly Rodriquez suffered three types of abuse at the hands of her live-in boyfriend.50 In
addition to raping and psychologically abusing Nelly, her boyfriend
slapped her; pulled her hair; bent her over a chair; “hit and punched
her on many occasions; tried to strangle her with an extension cord;
. . . punched her in the abdomen while she was pregnant with their
son, in an attempt to induce an abortion; threw bleach in her face;
and held a baseball bat to her head and threatened to kill her with
it.”51 Ultimately, after suffering from continuous domestic abuse
for over six years, Nelly stabbed her boyfriend to death during an
argument.52
Like Nelly Rodriguez, the wife in the case of State v.
Hennum also suffered multiple episodes of horrendous physical
violence, at the hands of her husband, throughout their thirteen year
marriage.53 For example, on one occasion, she suffered a punctured
lung when her husband hit her in the ribs and on another occasion
she suffered a broken nose and severe lacerations on her face after
her husband hit her in the face with a beer bottle.54 On another
occasion, her husband kicked her with steel-toed boots, which
caused the rupture, and subsequent removal of her spleen.55 On the
final day that he abused her, he pinned her to the floor with his
hands on her throat, pulled out chunks of her hair, tore the door off
of a closet and threw it at her, hurled a piece of firewood at her,
tossed a car part at her and, when she tried to protect herself by hiding under the kitchen table, he grabbed a rocking chair and threw it
at her, causing the chair to break.56 That night, while he was sleeping, the wife shot her husband to death to end the abuse once and
for all.57
Unfortunately, abusive men not only batter their wives and
girlfriends but often batter other family members as well. Child
abuse is more likely to occur in families where there is domestic
violence between the parents. In fact, caseworkers trained to screen
for familial abuse, estimate that there is domestic violence among
the parents in one half of the homes where a child is mistreated.58
Other researchers have found that the presence of interspousal
abuse foreshadows future child abuse because in almost three quarters of the homes where there is domestic violence among the parents, the children ultimately abuse their own children later in life.59
The Idaho Supreme Court in People v. Stuart described a
lethal combination of both spousal abuse and child abuse.60 In
Stuart, a battered woman’s abusive live-in boyfriend, Gene Stuart,
ultimately beat her three year old son to death.61 Prior to the toddler’s death, Stuart had “a ten year-history of seemingly endless
incidents of beatings, chokings, assaults, rapes and tortures, some at
the point of a gun or knife, inflicted upon all the former wives, girlfriends and children whom [Stuart] was able to bring within his control.”62 Stuart’s first wife testified that, during their first three years
of marriage, Stuart physically abused her more than thirty times,
including choking her and striking her arms, head and back.63 In
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fact, Stuart often choked his victims into submission, including his
own son by a former marriage “who was choked until the boy
lapsed into unconsciousness.”64 A rather bizarre, recent example of
the same combination of domestic violence and child abuse
occurred in October of 2006, when a woman’s physical fight with
her boyfriend culminated with her “grabbing the couple’s onemonth-old son by the legs and using him to clobber the
boyfriend.”65
Domestic Abuse Suffered By Victims Of Battered Child’s
Syndrome: Historical Development of Battered Child’s Syndrome
Like battered women, battered children have only been
legally protected from domestic violence in relatively recent times.
Cases in early American law in which a child successfully alleged
abuse by a parent or guardian are few and far between.66 In fact, in
1875, a young girl named Mary Ellen was starved and severely
beaten by her stepmother.67 The abused child was placed under the
protection of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
because there were no facilities to care for her.68 In arguing Mary
Ellen’s case, the President of the Society pointed out: “The child is
an animal. If there is no justice for it as a human being, it shall at
least have the rights of the stray cur in the street. It shall not be
abused.”69 Mary Ellen’s case is regarded as the beginning of modern day treatment of child abuse and resulted in the founding of the
New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children.70
Even if children who were known to be abused by their
parents might be entitled to some protection after the Mary Ellen
case, the medical profession often wrongly concluded that the
injuries of abused children had been sustained accidentally.
Treating physicians were very slow initially to realize that the recurrent, multiple fractures sustained by some infants and small children
were, in fact, inflicted by the children’s parents.71 The doctors usually attributed the fractures to the children being accident prone or
suffering from some rare metabolic disorders rather than even considering the possibility that the children’s parents had deliberatively caused the fractures.72
In fact, it was not until 1962, that the term “battered child
syndrome” was first coined by Pediatrician C. Henry Kempe to
describe "a clinical condition in young children who have received
serious physical abuse, generally from a parent or foster parent".73
Dr. Kempe cautioned physicians, who began using the term for
diagnostic purposes, “to have a high initial level of suspicion of the
diagnosis of the battered-child syndrome in instances of subdural
hematoma, multiple unexplained fractures at different stages of
healing, failure to thrive, when soft tissue swelling or skin bruising
are present, or in any other situation where the degree and type of
injury is at variance with the history given regarding its occurrence.
. . .”74 Infants and young children who sustain this type of lifethreatening abuse would clearly fall within the parameters of the
domestic abuse syndrome.
In addition to pediatricians relying on the term “battered
child syndrome” for diagnostic purposes, prosecuting attorneys
began to rely on expert testimony regarding the syndrome for evidentiary purposes in the criminal trials of abusive parents.75 In
1971, the California Court of Appeals in People v. Jackson became
the first appellate court to allow medical testimony regarding BCS
as proof that a child’s injuries were not accidental.76
The California court described the characteristics of BCS as follows:
1. The child is usually under three years of age;77
2. There is evidence of bone injury at different times;
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3 .There are subdural hematomas with or without skull fractures;
4. There is a seriously injured child who does not have a history
given that fits the injuries;
5. There is evidence of soft-tissue injury; and
6. There is evidence of neglect.
The injuries suffered by the thirteen month old boy in
Jackson, were typical of BCS, including recent fractures of both his
arms, ten broken ribs, second and third degree burns over 23% of
his body, a distended abdomen and an injury to his liver.79
The pediatrician who testified in the Jackson case opined that “`it
would take thousands of children to have the severity and number
and degree of injuries that this child had over the span of time that
he had by accidental means.”80
Since Jackson was decided over thirty-five years ago, at
least two circuit courts81 and thirty-three other state courts have followed California’s lead and admit expert testimony regarding BCS
as prosecutorial evidence against child abusers.82 In addition, the
United States Supreme Court, in Estelle v. McGuire, sustained the
admissibility of expert testimony concerning BCS as evidence of
prior injuries in the prosecution of a father for the death of his sixmonth-old daughter, Tori McGuire.83 Like the injuries suffered by
the infant in Jackson, the horrendous abuse suffered by Tori, were
also typical of those suffered by a victim of BCS. An autopsy
revealed that Tori had twenty-nine contusions on her abdomen, seventeen contusions on her chest, a lacerated large intestine, a split
liver, a split pancreas, damage to her heart and lungs, rectal tearing
and seven week old, partly healed fractures of several of her ribs.84
Tori’s father claimed that she suffered the injuries from falling off
of a couch.85 In affirming the father’s conviction of second degree
murder of Tori, the Court noted that “evidence demonstrating battered child syndrome help[ed] to prove that the child died at the
hands of another and not by falling off a couch. . . it also tend[ed]
to establish that the ‘other,’ whoever it may be, inflicted the injuries
intentionally.”86
Types Of Domestic Abuse Suffered By Victims Of Battered Child’s
Syndrome
If victims of battered child’s syndrome survive and remain
in the home of the abusive parent, the battering almost always continues. As they grow older, battered children suffer the same kind of
injuries from their parents that an abused woman suffers at the
hands of her abusive spouse; however, domestic abuse syndrome is
relevant in both cases. For example, in In re Appeal in Maricopa
County, the Arizona Appellate Court described how, like an adult
victim of DAS, the typical battered child, is “subjected to horrific
abuse, more than episodic or occasional, sustained repetitive terrorizing abuse over long periods of time."87 In Maricopa County, both
twelve year old K.T. and her younger sister suffered “terrible and
degrading physical and emotional abuse” throughout their lives
until K.T. ultimately killed their abusive mother.88 Moreover, like
Nelly Rodriguez, who was raped by her live-in boyfriend, child victims of DAS also suffer from intra-familial sexual abuse.
Almost one-half (46%) of all child rape is incestuous and 85% of
all child sexual abuse is committed by a family member, relative or
care provider.89 Children who suffer from DAS, like K.T. and her
sister, are at increased risk of having “delays in reaching developmental milestones,” often refuse “to attend school,” and suffer from
“separation anxiety disorders.”90 They are also at increased risk of
developing health and behavioral problems as adults, including
“smoking, alcoholism, drug abuse, eating disorders, severe obesity,
depression, suicide, sexual promiscuity, and certain chronic dis-
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eases.”91 In addition, they may suffer from “aggressive behaviors,”
criminal activity, post-traumatic stress disorder, personality disorders, schizophrenia, and may inflict abuse on their own children and
spouse.92
In addition to physical or sexual abuse, many child victims of DAS also suffer from “psychological traumas”, including
“sensory overload with light, sound, stench, aversive taste, itching,
pain, or prevention of sleep.”93 For example, in Brodie v Summit
County Children’s’ Services Board, the father of eleven-year-old
Tara Cook imprisoned his daughter in stairwells and closets and
shackled her to the bathroom sink for almost one month, in addition
to beating, burning, and starving her.94 In M.A. v. J.A. the parents
of a twelve-year-old boy confined the child in a three by four foot
dog cage for two hours each week, during a period of two months,
because he was expelled from his religion class.95
The devastating impact that psychological abuse can have
on child victims of DAS was described in a 1986 study where
researchers found that children who were psychologically maltreated felt “unloved,” “unwanted” and “inferior” and displayed “low
self-esteem” and a “negative view of the world.”96 In addition to
manifesting “aggressiveness [and] inadequate social behavior,”97
as adolescents, they sometimes became truants or runaways or
exhibited “destructive, depressed [or] suicidal” behavior.”98
Children who are not direct victims of domestic violence
frequently witness the abuse of their siblings or the battering of one
parent by the other. According to a 2005 study conducted by the
Children’s’ Defense Fund, as many as ten million children each year
witness domestic violence.99 In In re Edward C., the California
Appellate Court described how two un-abused brothers, aged six
and nine, repeatedly “watched the vicious treatment of their [seven
year old] sister” by their abusive father, who admonished them that
“the beatings were on the command of the Lord.”100
The court concluded that it was “difficult to conceive that the
brothers could not be emotionally or psychologically scarred by
witnessing the constant acts of cruelty upon their sister.”101
Unfortunately, there is increasing evidence that the
California court in Edward C. was right. Even un-abused children
who witness domestic violence will suffer from collateral damage,
and experience the same psychological problems as children who
are directly abused.102 Children who witness domestic violence
exhibit the same confusion, guilt, anxiety, loss of self-esteem and
depression as those who are direct victims.103 Moreover, they also
develop similar behavior problems, including nightmares, bedwetting, learning difficulties and eating disorders.104 Like their abused
siblings, child witnesses also can be aggressive, disobedient and
display dysfunctional behavior.105 Unfortunately, children who
have witnessed domestic violence are also at a greater risk for substance abuse problems.106
The Domestic Abse Syndrome As Part of The Self-Defense
Plea of Women and Children Who Are Charged With Killing
Their Abusers

Overview of Self-Defense Pleas by Victims of Domestic Abuse
Syndrome
When victims of DAS are prosecuted for killing their
abusers, they frequently claim that they acted in self-defense. Selfdefense, in the case of both battered women and battered children,
is based on the principle that a person “who is unlawfully attacked
by another and who has no opportunity to resort to the law for his
defense, should be able to take reasonable steps to defend himself
[or herself].”107 A homicide committed in self-defense is classified
as a “justifiable homicide” as opposed to an “excused homicide.”108
Justification “declares the allegedly criminal act legal,” and therefore only requires “an objective evaluation of the criminal act.”109
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On the other hand, “excuse admits the act’s criminality, but declares
the criminal actor not to be worthy of blame,” and therefore,
requires only “a subjective evaluation of the criminal actor’s state
of mind.”110 Excuses for homicide include insanity, accident, sufficient provocation and an honest, but unreasonable belief in the
need for self-defense.111
Prior to the late 1970s, battered women who killed their
abusers tended to rely on insanity to prove excuse for the homicide.112 When a battered woman pled insanity she claimed that,
because of her mental condition at the time of the murder, she was
not guilty, either because she did not know what she was doing or
because she did not know that she did anything wrong.113
The insanity defense was usually a “complete” defense, in the
sense that the woman would not be legally responsible for the homicide.114 However, it soon became clear that insanity was not an
appropriate defense in most cases involving self-defense by a battered woman. As the Oklahoma court noted in Bechtel v. State,
“[b]ased upon our independent review of the available resources on
the subject, we believe that the [battered woman] syndrome is a
mixture of psychological and physiological symptoms, but is not a
mental disease in the context of insanity”.115 Moreover, if battered
women were acquitted based on insanity, they were often committed to mental institutions for indefinite periods of time.116 Because
of this harsh result during the late 1970s, defense attorneys began to
explore defending battered women charged with killing their
abusers on the basis that their homicides were justified rather than
excused.
Traditionally, a homicide is justifiable providing the defendant can “show reasonable ground[s] to apprehend a design to…do
some great bodily injury,” and “imminent danger of such design
being accomplished.”117 The circumstances surrounding the murder
of a batterer by a DAS victim may, of course, satisfy these traditional requirements if the homicide occurs during an abusive attack.
For example, in State v. Lynch, the Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed the manslaughter conviction of a nineteen-year-old woman
who shot her middle-aged husband while she was trying to retreat
from his physical attack and after warning him three times that she
was going to shoot.118 There is little doubt that her fear for her life
was justified since her husband had previously beaten her twenty to
thirty times, including hitting her so hard with a baseball bat that
she was unable to walk for several weeks.119
More often, however, the murder of an abuser by a DAS
victim occurs in a situation which does not conform to the usual
self-defense model, such as when the homicide occurs between
attacks while the batterer is passive or asleep. For example, in State
v. Gallegos, the New Mexico Court of Appeal reversed a battered
wife’s conviction of voluntary manslaughter where she shot and
stabbed her husband while he was lying in bed after he had been
drinking.120 Earlier in the day, the husband had sexually abused her
and threatened to kill her.121 Moreover, in the past, he had beaten
her and thrown her against a wall, causing the premature birth of
their second child.122
Obviously, when a murder occurs in a non-confrontational
setting, victims of domestic abuse often encounter formidable
obstacles in proving that there were “reasonable grounds” for
believing that they were in “imminent” danger. In The Battered
Woman, Dr. Walker helped provide abused women with the objective proof they needed to justify their self-defense pleas in a nonconfrontational setting.123 In her book, Walker explained how the
three stage pattern of domestic abuse allows the battered women to
anticipate when physical violence is imminent.124 Dr. Walker also
described the psychological reactions of hypervigilance and the
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learned helplessness manifested by battered women, which helps to
explain why battered women may be objectively justified in killing
their passive abusers.125
When the term battered child syndrome is used to describe
the permanent psychological effects of domestic violence, the
effects are virtually identical to the psychological impact characteristically associated with BWS. The same three stage pattern of
abuse, which is found in BWS, also occurs in the battered child syndrome. Additionally, the characteristics of hypervigilance and
learned helplessness are also exhibited by children who are victims
of DAS and helps explain why they might be objectively justified
in killing their abusive parents.126 The term battered child syndrome
is currently used both as originally coined by Dr. Kempe, as a term
describing the severe physical abuse of an infant or small child,127
and as a term describing the psychological effects of prolonged
abuse of an older child or adolescent, as part of a child’s selfdefense plea.128 Although Dr. Kempe’s term bears the same name,
as the Maryland Appellate Court pointed out in State v. Smullen, his
term “had nothing whatever to do with a self-defense argument by
a parent-killing child, but focused entirely on identifying child
abuse.129 Nevertheless, the Smullen court commented that applying battered child syndrome as part of a self-defense plea in a parricide case did “not seem to be inconsistent” with the syndrome’s
original function. Dr. Kempe noted that the problems of a battered
child did not involve just physical injury, “but that, except for children who were actually killed or endured permanent brain damage,
`the most devastating aspect of abuse and neglect is the permanent
adverse effects on the developmental process and the child’s emotional well-being.’”130
The Basis for a Self-Defense Plea by All Victims of Domestic
Abuse Syndrome Is the Same
Women and Children Who Are Victims of Domestic Abuse
Syndrome Manifest the Same Three Stage Pattern of Abuse
Domestic abuse of both women and children typically
occurs in “recurring patterns,” consisting of three-stage cycles. 131
Dr. Walker described the phases of these cycles, in the context of a
battered woman, as follows:
The first phase is the ‘tension-building’ period. The second stage is the ‘acute explosion’ period when the abuse
takes place. The third stage is the ‘loving, contrition’
period. It is during the tension-building period that the
battered woman develops a heightened sensitivity to any
kinds of cues of distress. Thus, because of her intimate
knowledge of her batterer, the battered woman perceives
danger faster and more accurately as she is more acutely
aware that a new or escalated violent episode is about to
occur.132
Like a battered woman, a battered child develops “a heightened sensitivity” during the tension-building stage and is able to anticipate
when an “acute explosion” phase is about to begin.133
This helps explain why child-victims of abuse tend to kill most
often during the tension-building stage because they lack the physical strength to defend themselves during the acute explosion stage
when the abuse occurs.
Battered children often kill their abusive parents while the
abusers are in apparently non-threatening situations, such as being
asleep or incapacitated. The Minnesota Supreme Court noted in
State v. McLennan that an attack on a parent by a child “does not
occur at the time of the conflict; rather, it occurs when the child has
the opportunity to attack.”134
Each of the three phases of abuse is characterized by specific behavior patterns on the part of the batterer. According to the
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Smullen court, during the first tension-building phase, “minor incidents of physical, sexual or emotional abuse” occur and the “batterer begins to express hostility toward” the victim though he or she
“is not severely abused”.135 The second acute explosion phase consists of “an acute battering incident, in which the batterer `typically
unleashes a barrage of verbal and physical aggression that can leave
the [victim] severely shaken and injured.’”136 During the last loving-contrition phase “the batterer apologizes, seeks forgiveness, and
promises to change.”137 In State v. Richardson, an expert witness
testified that the loving-contrition or honeymoon phase is “very
seductive to the battered woman for staying in the abusive relationship.”138 The “apparent transformation of the abuser back into a
loving partner. . . `provides the positive reinforcement for remaining in the relationship.’”139 In Richardson, the abusive husband’s
behavior during the loving contrition phase contrasted markedly
with the acute explosion phase when he “kicked her, attempted to
choke her and threatened to kill her.”140
It is also during the contrite phase of the violence cycle
that battered women and children become hopeful that the abuse
will cease. They pin their hopes on the profuse apologies and fervent promises, often accompanied by gifts. Ironically, this emotional attachment to the batterer also helps to explain why victims of
domestic violence may not leave an abusive relationship.141
Unfortunately, their hopes are soon dashed, and rather than diminishing over time, the cycle of abuse often “gets more intense, more
repetitive, more frequent and more violent and consequently more
lethal.”142
Both Women and Children Victims of Domestic Abuse Syndrome
Manifest the Same Psychological Characteristic of Hypervigilance
Dr. Walker explained how the “recurring patterns” of an
abusive relationship allow a battered woman to “become expert at
recognizing the warning signs of an impending assault from her
partner.”143 This expertise, known as “hypervigilance,” is displayed
by both women and children who are victims of DAS. For example, hypervigilance in the context of a battered child was described
by the Washington Court of Appeals in State v. Janes as “a heightened ability to discern preaggressive behavior in others . . . which
would be almost imperceptible to one who was not abused.”144
According to the Janes court, even when very young, battered children, like battered women, “develop `a very finely tuned antenna
for impending violence [which] . . . picks up’ low level cues that
people who have not been traumatized would not see.”145 In the
context of a battered woman, the California Supreme Court in
People v. Humphrey described how “’[r]emarks or gestures which
are merely offensive or perhaps even meaningless to the general
public may be understood by the abused individual as an affirmation of impending physical abuse.’”146 The sign may be ‘`‘that look
in his eye’; for others, it is the advent of heavy drinking, or heightened irrational jealousy.”147
An abuse victim’s hypervigilence can act as an early warning system, enabling them to better protect themselves from
abuse.148 For example, in People v. Sherman, Randy Sherman,
who was physically and psychologically abused by his father
throughout his childhood, described how his father gave him the
“`same menacing look’” when he was “`about to change into the
Incredible Hulk,’” before whipping Randy with a belt or extension
cord or beating him with a dog chain.149
Legal commentators stress that “hypermonitoring” is the
“key to the realization that child abuse victims learn how to tell
when their parents are going to hurt them and that they are afraid
even in the absence of confrontation.”150 The Washington Supreme
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Court in Janes, explained the manifestations of this characteristic in
battered children as follows:
Such a hypervigilant child is acutely aware of his or her
environment and remains on the alert for any signs of
danger, events to which the unabused child may not
attend. The child’s history of abusive encounters with his
or her battering parent leads him or her to be overly cautious and to perceive danger in subtle changes in the parent’s expressions or mannerisms. Such ‘hypermonitor
ing’ behavior . . . means the child becomes sensitized to
these subtle changes and constantly ‘monitors’ the environment (particularly the abuser) for those signals which
suggest danger is imminent.151
Both Women and Children Who Are Victims of Domestic Abuse
Syndrome Manifest the Same Psychological Effect of Learned
Helplessness: Battered Women Experience: The Psychological
Characteristic of Learned Helplessness
Dr. Walker also described the psychological phenomenon
of “learned helplessness” which aids in explaining why a battered
woman does not leave her abuser and “why an apparently normal
person loses his or her ability to predict how their actions will affect
their safety.”152 Dr. Walker explained that:
in applying the learned helplessness concept to battered
women, the process of how the battered woman becomes
victimized grows clearer. Repeated batterings, like electrical shocks (in animal experiments), diminish the
woman’s motivation to respond. She becomes passive.
Secondly, her cognitive ability to perceive success is
changed. She does not believe her response will result in
a favorable outcome, whether or not it might. Next, having generalized her helplessness, the battered woman
does not believe anything she does will alter the outcome.
. . . Finally, her sense of emotional well-being becomes
precarious. She is more prone to depression and anxiety.153
As the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeal explained in Bechtel,
“cultural characteristics of women influence the battered woman’s
belief that if she could only do something to help her abuser, then
the bad part of him will go away” leading the woman “to develop
coping skills rather than escape skills and [to] develop[ ] a ‘psychological paralysis’ and ‘learned helplessness.’”154 The “etiology of
this aspect” was described by the Smullen court as follows:
“Through experience, the victim learns that when she
attempts to defend herself -- by reaching out to others or
trying to leave – that she will be the victim of more
severe violence. The batterer blames the abusive relationship on her inability to respond to his ever-increasing
demands so that the most effective short-term method of
reducing incidents of violence is to be more sub
servient.”155
Often battered women lack self-confidence and feel
responsible for the abusive relationship.156 In fact, “[c]ommon
characteristics of battered women [include] low self-esteem, denial
of anger and fear, feelings of guilt, social isolation, depression and
the belief that no one can help them.”157
Although some battered women make efforts to stop or
mitigate the abuse,158 because of this learned helplessness many
other “victims of repeated abuse will eventually abandon any efforts
to leave the abusive situation.”159 For example, in State v. Allery, a
battered wife stayed with her husband despite the fact that he
“struck her on the head with a tire iron” causing her to be hospitalized and engaged in a “consistent pattern of physical abuse” includ-
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ing “periodic whippings, assaults with knives and numerous beatings from [his] fists throughout their marriage.”160 The Washington
Supreme Court opined that a battered woman, like Mrs. Allery, who
suffers from learned helplessness, “is psychologically locked into
her situation due to economic dependence on the man, an abiding
attachment to him, and the failure of the legal system to adequately
respond to the problem.”161
Similarly, in what the Kansas
Supreme Court described in Hundley as
a textbook case of the battered wife,. . . . Betty Hundley
had survived her husband’s brutal beatings for ten years.
`Her bones had been broken, her teeth knocked out and
repeated bruises inflicted, but she did not leave him. She
called the police occasionally but would continue to stay
with Carl Hundley. The mystery, as in all battered wife
cases, is why she remained after the beatings. . . .
[T]here is no easy answer to why battered women stay
with their abusive husbands. Quite likely emotional and
financial dependency and fear are the primary reasons for
remaining in the household. They feel incapable of
reaching out for help and justifiably fear reprisals from
their angry husbands if they leave or call the police. The
abuse is so severe, for so long a time, and the threat of
great bodily harm so constant, it creates a standard men
tal attitude in its victims.”162
Battered Children Experience the Psychological Characteristic
of Learned Helplessness
Battered children also display learned helplessness, thus
sharing another key characteristic with battered women, which is
relevant in a plea of self defense. In fact, as the Washington
Supreme noted in Janes, “learned helplessness” is “especially
severe” in children.163 The psychological effects of the cumulative
terror caused by a prolonged pattern of long term abuse represents
“a profound kind of blow to how a person functions that is devastating to a child.”164 There is “every reason to believe that a child’s
entire world view and sense of self may be conditioned by reaction
to that abuse.”165
Their reaction may lead children to feel that, not only their
safety, but their very existence is threatened at all times, especially
since they may perceive their abusive parents as “very powerful—
perhaps omnipotent.”166 Overall, the world of battered children is
permeated with a sense of powerlessness, fear, and anxiety.167
The perceived hopelessness of their desperate situation results in a
“pervasive sense of helplessness that results from feeling trapped in
a situation from which they cannot escape.” 168
Both Women and Children Who Are Victims of Domestic Abuse
Syndrome Suffer From the Same Emotional Impediments to Their
Ability to Leave Their Abusers
Battered Women Are Emotionally Unable To Leave Their Abusers
Domestic violence victims, after years of forced social isolation, may perceive no superior alternative than remaining with
their abusers.169 This result occurs when the woman’s efforts to
improve the relationship or extract herself from the situation prove
futile, she learns she cannot escape the relationship because of her
financial status or fear of retribution, and she abandons her
efforts.”170 Most battered women have sought help unsuccessfully
from police or other protective agencies. One study of women in
Philadelphia, who died at the hands of their abusive spouses, estimated that 64% of the women were known by the police to have
been physically abused before their deaths.171 In fact, some commentators suggest that, rather than suffering from learned helpless-
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ness, battered women are survivors whose “help seeking efforts are
largely unmet” and who most need “the resources and social support that would enable them to become more independent and leave
the batterer.”172
Another reason that women don’t leave abusive relationships is called “separation abuse,”, meaning that the battered
woman fears retaliation towards herself, her children, other family
members, friends or even co-workers.173 For example, in Koss, the
battered wife testified that her abusive husband threatened to kill
her children unless she dropped a domestic violence complaint she
had filed against him.174 Fears of retaliatory abuse appear to be
well-founded since the most frequently and seriously battered
women are those who are separated or divorced from their
abusers.175 Although only 10% of women are separated or divorced,
they account for 75% of all victims of domestic violence and are
fourteen times more likely to be battered than women who are still
cohabiting.176 Unfortunately, it is also accurate that, if the abuser
is unable to locate the battered woman, he may seek revenge on
other people who are important in her life.177
A report from the National Institute of Justice explains
how this type of evidence regarding learned helplessness and the
other factors influencing a battered woman’s decision not to leave
can assist a jury in understanding the abused woman’s perspective:
Understanding these and other obstacles to leaving or
staying away from a battering relationship assists the fact
finder in considering the context of a battered woman’s
efforts to resist, escape, and cope with a violent relationship. Without an appreciation of this context, the fact
finder’s deliberations may rest on faulty assumptions, for
example, that a woman who remains in an alleged abusive relationship has exaggerated or lied about the fact of
violence.178
Battered Children Are Emotionally Unable To Leave Their Abusers
Unfortunately, abused children face even more significant
obstacles to escaping from their abusive homes. Although the common expectation might be for the abused child to seek outside help,
“`there are compelling psychological reasons that make seeking and
getting help the rare exception, not the norm.’”179 Paradoxically,
despite the abuse, battered children frequently have strong emotional bonds with their abusive parents.180 As the Washington Supreme
Court noted in Janes: “Children are entirely dependent on the parent for emotional . . . support. They are extremely vulnerable and
tend to place great trust in their parents. It’s not as easy for a child
as it is for an adult to leave a troubled home.”181
It seems obvious that battered children also have far less
practical ability and wherewithal to run away from the abusive
home than battered women. Although some abused children do try
to run away, they usually do not know any safe place where they can
seek refuge.182 “Surviving on the streets is hardly a realistic alternative for youths with meager financial resources, limited education
and few skills.”183 Consequently, most of the children who do try
to run away are ultimately picked up and returned to their abusive
homes.184
Like battered women, battered children also fear that running away will only result in greater abuse, not only to them, but to
their other family members as well. Informing police or other
authorities of the abuse is often avoided by abused children for the
same reason. Unfortunately, like battered women, abused children
who do report the violence to authorities often fail to receive the
help they are so desperately seeking. As explained by the Janes
court: “Oftentimes, abused children will have sought outside help
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from authority figures…without gaining any satisfactory outcome.”185 Evidence in the Janes case revealed that Washington’s
Child Protective Services had been contacted at least three times by
neighbors and school teachers of the abused child, Andrew Janes,
because of the horrendous maltreatment Andrew endured from his
mother’s live in boyfriend but that “no action was taken.”186
The Washington Supreme Court in Janes also pointed out
that “[o]ther persons within the family are unable to help because
they frequently suffer abuse as well.”187 For example, in the Janes
case, both Andrew’s mother and brother also suffered physical
abuse.188 Moreover, most children are far more financially dependent on their parents than most battered women are on their spouses.
As noted by the court of appeals: “Children do not reach the age of
majority until they are 18 years of age . . . . Until then, they have
virtually no independent ability to support themselves, thus preventing them from escaping the abusive atmosphere.”189 Unlike
most adults, most children are unable to support themselves on their
own. The Janes court concluded that “[i]n the end, for the battered
child, all doors of escape appear closed.”190
The reasons why a battered child might ultimately resort to
parricide are also understandable based on the psychological effects
of prolonged abuse. As nationally known child abuse expert
Leonard P. Edwards explained, if a “child believes there is no
escape and that he or she will continue to be abused, the child may
take desperate action. Some children run away from home. In a
few cases a child may finally fight back by killing the abuser.”191
An example of a child finally fighting back by committing parricide
occurred in Maricopa County.192 In that case, after “years of
severe physical, psychological and emotional abuse and neglect,
twelve year old K.T. shot her mother in the back of the head, while
her mother was sleeping.”193 Defense expert Dr. Frank Miller testified at K.T.’s trial that he had “only seen a few cases” in his career
approaching “the heinous treatment” and “the terrible and degrading physical and emotional abuse suffered by [K.T.] and her
younger sister.”194 Dr. Miller commented that the “only ones that
have exceeded that that I’ve seen are always postmortem of the
child.”195 He explained that K.T. lived in “constant fear of imminent irrational punishment” which had been “worsening in intensity and severity to the point of possible death, punctuated by the
presence of a casket in the house in which, it was threatened by [the
mother that] K.T. and her sister could find themselves.
This was underscored by the fact that both K.T. and her sister had
been choked to the point of unconsciousness” by their “`sadistic’”
mother.196 K.T., and other people acting on her behalf, had “without success, sought help numerous times from state, police and
school officials.”197 In fact, “[w]ithin a week of the killing alone,
there was one more contact with the police and three with the
Arizona Department of Economic Security Child Protective
Services.”198 Dr. Miller compared K.T.’s “mental state” at the time
she shot her mother as being like
a concentration camp victim “[l]iving in a state of terror.”
He observed that such a mental state would cause someone to do an act otherwise violative of her own moral
standards and that K.T. believed that, particularly given
the lack of response from adult authorities from whom
she repeatedly had sought help, shooting her mother was
her only option to protect herself and her younger sister
from further peril and death. K.T. felt especially helpless
with regard to protecting her younger sister, whom she
believed to be suicidal.199
Both Women and Children Who Are Victims of Domestic Abuse
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Syndrome Suffer From the Same Financial Impediments to Their
Ability to Leave Their Abusers
Domestic Abuse of both Women and Children Occurs More
Frequently In Impoverished Families
Although domestic abuse syndrome cuts across socio-economic lines,200 it is clear that both domestic violence and child
abuse occur more frequently in low income families.201 In fact
“[r]esearch makes it clear that poverty increases the risk of both
domestic violence and child abuse and neglect.”202
According to a 2005 study by the Children’s’ Defense Fund,
“[p]overty is the single best predictor of child abuse and neglect”.203
Unfortunately, as of 2004, there were approximately 37
million Americans living below the poverty line,204 including more
than one out of every six American children.205 According to two
national surveys, “violence toward children, especially severe violence, is more likely to occur in households with annual incomes
below the poverty line.”206 Children who live in families with
annual incomes of less than $15,000 are twenty-two times more
likely to be abused or neglected than children living in families with
annual incomes of $30,000 or more.207
Data also suggests that women living in households with
lower annual incomes experience higher rates of domestic violence
than more affluent women.208 For example, according to one study,
during the period from 1993 until 1998, women living in households with annual incomes of less than $7,500 were almost seven
times more likely to suffer domestic violence than women living in
households with an annual income of $7,500 or more.209 Other
studies have shown that 20% to 30% of women receiving welfare
assistance suffered domestic violence within the past two years210
and over 50% reported that they had been subjected to physical
abuse by their male spouse or partner at some time in their adult
lives.211 In one ten-city study of 777 homeless parents, the majority of whom were mothers, 22% said that they had left their homes
because of domestic violence.212
It should be noted that there is “considerable dispute”
about whether this “disproportionate occurrence reflects greater
surveillance of low-income families, or greater stresses of poverty
or other factors.”213 Some researchers have concluded that the
increased prevalence of abuse among poor families “may be due to
the stress of poverty itself, as it places greater pressure on parents to
cope with the daily challenges of raising children.”214
The stresses of juggling the demands of daily life with little income
are likely to put a significant strain on a couple’s relationship, and
these tensions may erupt into violence.215 On the other hand, poor
families may simply have more contact with service professional
who report the abuse, like emergency room physicians in a public
hospital, whereas middle- and upper-income families may have the
wherewithal to conceal the abuse, such as by using private doctors
at a private hospital.
There is no dispute, however, that the challenges faced by
abusive families are likely to be “more difficult to cope with when
they have fewer resources.”216 The stress engendered by poverty
sometimes leads to one or both of the parents developing depression, drug or alcohol dependencies or mental health disabilities.217
For example, one study of welfare recipients demonstrated that
women who were victims of domestic violence at some point in
their lives suffered from drug and alcohol abuse, post traumatic
stress disorder and physical health problems at higher rates than
welfare recipients who had never been abused.218 Another study,
conducted only seven years ago, revealed that approximately 26%
of the children residing in families with low incomes (defined as
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families with incomes below 200% of the federal poverty threshold)
lived with a mentally ill parent.219 By comparison, only 10& to
11% of children residing in high income families lived with a mentally ill parent.220 Depression is also more prevalent among low
income families.221 The proportion of poor parents reporting
depressive symptoms fluctuated between 10% and 13% between
1998 and 2003.222 Coping with depression and trying to maintain
low-wage work can “make it difficult for parents to adequately care
for their children”.
Domestic Abuse Syndrome Victims from Impoverished Families
Are Financially Unable To Leave Their Abusers
Obviously, poverty also has a devastating effect on the
ability of all DAS victims to successfully escape from an abusive
relationship. Lack of economic resources makes leaving very difficult for many abused women, especially those with children to support.223 Batterers frequently control all of the couple’s finances,
and only the abusive spouse’s name may be on many or all of their
accounts.224 If the battered woman has never had telephone, electric or gas services in her own name, she will need to give each of
the utilities an initial deposit of as much as $100.00. Although that
may not seem like much, for a woman in extreme poverty, trying to
live on about $25.00 per day, it may well be money that she simply
does not have. For domestic violence victims who live in poverty,
even one deposit can be the difference between the battered woman
and her children moving on to safety and self sufficiency or returning in defeat to the batterer. As an expert witness in the Humphrey
case testified: “It really is the physical control of the woman
through economics and through relative social isolation combined
with the psychological techniques that makes her so dependent.”225
Unfortunately, resources to aid battered women in leaving abusive
relationships and setting up independent households are “severely
limited in most communities throughout the country.”226
Moreover, even if a woman does set up an independent
household, her limited economic resources will likely have a major
impact in enabling her to maintain her resolve to remain away from
her abusive partner. One study of 800 women found that the most
important factors for women making the decision whether or not to
return to the abuser all involved financial concerns, including
access to an independent income, child care and transportation.227
By comparison, only 16% of battered women who had their own
income planned to return to their batterers.228
The inability of impoverished a woman to meet her monthly bills by herself often leaves the woman with no choice for herself
and her children but to either go to a homeless shelter or return to
her abuser. Shelters for victims of domestic violence are only
meant to be short term and they are not designed to provide longterm housing. Many abused women who seek temporary refuge in
emergency shelters, ultimately return to their spouses, in large part
because they have no other source of income.229 Thus, it is not long
before the battered woman and her children are once again faced
with the Hobson’s choice of unremitting poverty and homelessness
or unremitting abuse.
Because Domestic Abuse Syndrome Impacts Women And
Children In Courts Should Also Admit Evidence of Battered
Child’s Syndrome As Part Of A Child’s Self Defense Plea
Because battered woman’s syndrome and battered child’s
syndrome of an older child, are the “functional and legal equivalent” of one another, it seems only logical that courts that admit
expert testimony re BWS as part of a woman’s self-defense plea,
should also admit expert testimony regarding BCS as part of a
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child’s self-defense plea.230 In upholding the admissibility of BCS
as part of a child’s self-defense plea for parricide, the Janes court
concluded that the “`battered woman syndrome and the battered
child syndrome constitute a single psychological disorder for purposes of expert testimony. . ..The differences between the two groups
are negligible.’”231 In Smullen, the Maryland Appellate Court recognized that “application of [the battered child] syndrome to a selfdefense argument in parricide cases would seem to be more a lateral extension of the battered spouse syndrome than a direct expansion of the battered child syndrome described by Dr. Kempe.”232
The Janes court pointed out that “children are both objectively and subjectively more vulnerable to the effects of violence
than are adults.” 233 Thus, “the rationale underlying the admissibility of testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome is at least
as compelling, if not more so, when applied to children.”234 As one
legal commentator put it: “Courts are slowly recognizing that
women and children should be treated similarly when they murder
after years, or a lifetime, of family violence.”235 The Janes court
concluded: “Neither law nor logic suggests any reason to limit to
women recognition of the impact a battering relationship may have
on the victim’s actions or perceptions.”236
Nevertheless, although an increasing number of courts
have found that expert testimony regarding the psychological
impact of BWS is admissible on the issue of self defense, surprisingly few courts have found that similar expert testimony regarding
BCS is also admissible.237 In the context of an abused woman,
according to a 1996 report from the National Institute of Justice,
expert testimony on “battering and its effects is admissible, at least
to some degree, or has been admitted . . ., in each of the 50 states
plus the District of Columbia.”238 Over three-quarters of these
states have admitted the testimony “to prove the defendant is a battered woman or that she ‘suffers from battered woman syndrome.’”239 In addition, the report noted that twelve states have
enacted statutes providing for the admissibility of expert testimony
regarding battering.240 Half of these statutory provisions refer
specifically to expert testimony on “battered woman syndrome”241
or “battered spouse syndrome” while the other half use broader language, referring to the nature and effects of family violence on the
beliefs, perceptions, and behaviors of the person being abused,
which would encompass all victims of DAS.242 In the federal judicial system, at least sixteen of the nineteen federal courts that have
considered the issue have also admitted expert testimony on battering in at least some cases.243
On the other hand, in the context of an abused child, thus
far, only two state supreme court decisions have admitted expert
testimony regarding the psychological effects of BCS as part of the
child’s self-defense plea in a parricide case.244 In fact, it was not
until 1993, over twenty years after the California Supreme Court
first admitted evidence regarding BCS in the prosecution of an abusive parent in Jackson, that the Washington Supreme Court, with
their decision in State v. Janes, became the first state supreme court
to admit expert testimony regarding BCS for self-defense purposes
where the abused child killed his abuser.245
In Janes, seventeen-year-old Andrew Janes had been subjected for over ten years to “‘chronic and enduring’” physical abuse
at the hands of Walter Jaloveckas, his mother’s live-in boyfriend,
which formed “an unremitting pattern of episodic terror.”246 For
example, when he was nine years old, Andrew was caught shoplifting and was beaten by Walter with a belt, a wire hanger and a plastic piggy bank.247 Shortly thereafter, Walter hit Andrew in the
mouth with a mop because the child had not wrung the mop out
properly.248 A week before Andrew’s tenth birthday, Walter used a
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sledgehammer to smash Andrew’s stereo.249 As a teenager, while
Andrew was doing the dishes, Walter struck him without provocation or warning, knocking him unconscious.250 Andrew was also
rendered unconscious when Walter hit him with a piece of firewood.251 Walter also threatened Andrew throughout his childhood
and adolescence with a litany of violent punishments: “Walter
threatened to nail Andrew’s hands to a tree, brand Andrew’s forehead, and take Andrew away from his mother by sending him to a
boy’s home. Other threatened punishments included placing
Andrew’s fingers on the hot wood stove, breaking Andrew’s fingers
with a ball peen hammer, and wrapping a crowbar around Andrew’s
head.”252 Walter undoubtedly had the ability to seriously injure
Andrew since on “one occasion, in the family’s presence”, Walter,
who was an “occasional” drug dealer, “physically assaulted and
threatened to kill [another] drug dealer.”253 In admitting expert testimony regarding the domestic abuse of a child, the Janes court concluded that “[g]iven the close relationship between the battered
woman and the battered child syndromes, the same reasons that justify admission of the former apply with equal force to the latter.”254
It was not until five years after the Janes case, that the
Ohio Supreme Court in State v. &emeth became the second state
supreme court to admit expert testimony regarding BCS as part of a
self-defense plea in a parricide case.255 &emeth involved the prosecution of sixteen-year-old Brian Nemeth for the murder of his abusive mother with a bow and arrow.256 Like Andrew Janes, Brian
had suffered years of abuse at the hands of his alcoholic mother,
including being hit with a stick, burned on his hand with a cigarette
and cut on his side with a coat hanger.257 In the six months before
her death, Brian’s mother’s drinking, and the abuse that went with
it, escalated until it was a nightly occurrence.258 On the evening of
her death, Brian spent most of the night in his bedroom with the
door locked, listening to his mother cursing him and threatening to
“beat his face in” and kill him.259 Finally, when Brian heard his
mother walk away, he got his bow and arrows, found his mother
lying on the couch, and shot her five times in the head and neck.260
The therapist who examined Brian diagnosed him as suffering from
BCS and noted that he had “very compatible symptoms as do
women in abusive relationships.”261 In finding the expert testimony regarding BCS to be admissible, the &emeth court stated that
such evidence would help to show that a child’s behavior was “consistent with that of an abused child and would lend support to his
testimony that he had been abused both generally and just prior to
the killing.”262
In the decade since the &emeth case was decided, no other
state supreme court has upheld the admissibility of expert testimony in a parricide case although the Minnesota Supreme Court indicated in dicta in MacLennan that such testimony might be allowed
in an appropriate case.263 In MacLennan, seventeen year old Jason
MacLennan was convicted of first degree murder in the shooting
death of his father.264 On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that the lower court had not erred in excluding expert testimony regarding BCS since, although the evidence demonstrated a
“tense relationship” between Jason and his father, it did not demonstrate the physical or sexual abuse which would “give rise to battered child syndrome.”265 However, the Minnesota court opined
that “[l]ike expert testimony on battered woman syndrome. . .
expert testimony on battered child syndrome may help to explain a
phenomenon not within the understanding of an ordinary lay person.” The Court concluded that “relevant evidence that helps
explain the characteristics possessed by children who have been
battered and outlines the probable responses to traumatic events
would be allowed.”267
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Expert Testimony Regarding the Psycological Effects of
Domestic Abuse Syndrome Meets the Legal Requirements For
Admissability As Part of a Self-Defense Plea
Overview
In order for expert testimony regarding the psychological
effects of domestic abuse syndrome to be admissible as part of a self
defense plea, the testimony must meet several legal requirements.
There is little doubt that expert testimony regarding the psychological effects of domestic abuse syndrome meets the threshold
requirements that the evidence is both relevant and reliable regardless of whether the abuse victim is a woman or a child.268
The state of mind of the woman or child at the time they killed their
abusers is clearly relevant and numerous cases have held that both
battered woman’s syndrome and battered child’s syndrome meet the
requisite level of reliability for admission.
In addition, in order to be admissible, expert testimony
regarding the psychological effects of DAS on both women and
children must be “[r]elated to a subject that is sufficiently beyond
common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the
trier of fact.”269 Expert testimony regarding the psychological
effects of domestic abuse syndrome clearly meets this threshold
requirement as well. This type of evidence is sometimes referred to
as “social framework testimony” since it provides “a social and psychological context in which the trier can understand and evaluate
claims about the ultimate fact.”270 Clearly, this “social framework”
and the complex psychological characteristics exhibited by battered
women and children, such as hypervigilance and learned helplessness, are beyond the knowledge of the ordinary lay person and the
opinion of an expert would be of great assistance to the jury.
Finally, in order for expert testimony regarding the psychological effects of DAS on women and children to be admissible,
it must also be determined that the probative value of the evidence
is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.271
There can be little doubt that the critical importance of allowing the
jury to fully understand the abusive relationship and its psychological impact outweighs any potentially prejudicial animosity which
the jury might feel towards the abuser. It is also clear that, rather
than being a pretext to explain unlawful behavior, expert testimony
regarding DAS would be offered to help the jury come to a full
understanding of the factual and psychological context in which the
homicide occurred, so that they can reach a fair and informed verdict.
Relevance Of Expert Testimony Regarding Domestic Abuse
Syndrome
Expert testimony regarding the psychological effects of
domestic abuse syndrome on both women and children is relevant
because it “has a tendency in reason to prove or disprove [a] disputed fact of consequence to the determination of an action.”272 For
example, in State v. Hill, the South Carolina Supreme Court
reversed Sherry Hill’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter in the
shooting death of her live-in boyfriend, who verbally and physically abused her, holding that it was error not to admit expert testimony regarding battered woman’s syndrome since such testimony “is
relevant to the issue of self-defense.”273
Similarly, in holding in &emeth that expert testimony
regarding battered child’s syndrome “was relevant,” the Ohio
Supreme Court noted: “Evidence that would support a defendant’s
explanation of the events at issue and would provide evidence as to
his possible state of mind at the time of the incident is clearly rele-
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vant to his or her defense.”274 Obviously, expert testimony regarding DAS of both women and children would be proffered precisely
to help the jury understand the psychiatric effects of battering on the
abused defendant’s state of mind at the time of the murder of the
abuser. For example, the psychological effect of hypervigilance,
which is manifested by both women and children who are victims
of DAS, is “directly relevant in a self-defense context” since the
ability of battered women and children to recognize the small
changes in behavior that foreshadow abuse enables them to “sense
the escalation in the frequency and intensity of the violence.”275
Learned helplessness is also relevant in a self-defense context, as it
offers an explanation as to why battered women and children simply do not leave the home and take some other actions against her
abuser.276 In fact, according to the 1996 report from the National
Institute of Justice, two-thirds of the states considered expert testimony regarding the effects of battering on the women to be relevant
to determining why the defendant did not leave the battering relationship.277 Thus, there is unlikely to be any dispute that expert testimony regarding DAS is relevant.
Reliability Of Expert Testimony Regarding Domestic Abuse
Syndrome
Expert testimony regarding domestic abuse syndrome of
both women and children is also reliable. For example, in admitting expert testimony regarding battered woman’s syndrome in the
Koss case, the Ohio Supreme Court commented that the syndrome
“has gained substantial scientific acceptance to warrant admissibility.”278 Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court in &emeth made it clear
that expert testimony regarding BCS was also reliable when the
court stated that “the behavioral and psychological effects of prolonged child abuse on the child have been generally accepted in the
medical and psychiatric communities and therefore unquestionably
meet the requisite level of reliability for admission as the subject of
expert testimony.”279 Indeed, in holding that expert testimony
regarding BCS was “both relevant and reliable”280 in proving selfdefense in a non-confrontational parricide case, the &emeth court
commented that the case presented “precisely the kind of situation
in which expert testimony is most necessary.”281
The Psychological Impact Of Domestic Abuse On Women Is
Beyond The Common Experience Of The Jury
Numerous courts have held that expert testimony regarding BWS concerns a subject sufficiently “beyond the ken” of the
jury that the opinion of an expert is necessary.282 As the Minnesota
Supreme Court explained in MacLennan: “[E]xpert testimony on
battered woman syndrome can help jurors understand the interpersonal dynamics involved in abusive relationships, something with
which many jurors are unfamiliar.”283 Similarly, in Humphrey, the
California Supreme Court agreed that “not only was expert testimony regarding BWS needed `to explain a behavior pattern that might
otherwise appear unreasonable to the average person” but it was
also essential to explain how a battered person “`might think, react,
or behave, it places the behavior in an understandable light.”284
The court pointed out that expert testimony regarding BWS is
“`aimed at an area where the purported common knowledge of the
jury may be very much mistaken, an area where jurors’ logic, drawn
from their own experience, may lead to a wholly incorrect conclusion, an area where expert knowledge would enable the jurors to
disregard their prior conclusions as being common myths rather
than common knowledge.’”285 In fact, according to the 1996 report
from the National Institute of Justice, one-third of the states have
“explicitly noted that the testimony is admissible to rebut common
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myths and misperceptions about battered women.”286
In Bechtel, noting that “misconceptions regarding battered
women abound,” the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeal, gave
examples of several of these “common myths” including “beliefs
that the women are masochistic and enjoy the beatings and that they
intentionally provoke their husbands into fits of rage.”287
The Bechtel court concluded that, without expert testimony, it is,
therefore, “more likely than not that the average juror will draw
from his or her own experience or common myths, which may lead
to a wholly incorrect conclusion.”288
Expert testimony regarding BWS also helps a jury to
understand an abused woman’s hypermonitoring behavior which
enables her to predict when domestic violence will occur. As the
New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Kelly explained: “Depending
on its content, the expert’s testimony might [ ] enable the jury to
find that the battered wife, because of the prior beatings, numerous
beatings, as often as once a week, for seven years, from the day they
were married to the day he died, is particularly able to predict accurately the likely extent of violence in any attack on her.
That conclusion could significantly affect the jury’s evaluation of
the reasonableness of defendant’s fear for her life.”289
Perhaps the most important area where the jury needs
expert testimony to understand the battered woman’s situation is
regarding her inability to leave the abusive relationship or to obtain
help from other family members or from the authorities.
The Koss court explained how expert testimony regarding BWS
helps “dispel the ordinary lay person’s perception that a woman in
a battering relationship is free to leave at any time” and “would
counter any ‘common sense’ conclusions by the jury that if the beatings were really that bad the woman would have left her husband
much earlier.”290 The Washington Supreme Court in Allery pointed
out that such expert testimony also helps a jury understand why a
battered woman “would not inform police or friends and would fear
more aggression against herself.”291 Overall, the cumulative effect
of expert testimony regarding the psychological impact of domestic
violence assists the jury in determining whether the abused person’s
acts “were those of the reasonable person similarly situated for
whom the law of self-defense provides comfort.” 292
The fact that it is the psychological effects rather than the
physical effects of battering that makes expert testimony regarding
DAS crucially necessary also explains why expert testimony
regarding BWS is essential even if the defense has an opportunity
to put on extensive testimony from other witnesses as to the abuse
the woman endured from her deceased spouse. Although the other
witnesses’ testimony may be sufficient to describe the physical
abuse suffered by the battered woman, it is clear that the lay witnesses would not be able to explain the complex psychological
impact of the battering.
The Psychological Impact Of Domestic Abuse Syndrome On
Children Is Beyond The Common Experience Of The Jury
The reasons given by courts as to why the expert testimony regarding the psychological manifestations of BWS on a woman
should be admitted to help the jury “place [her] behavior in an
understandable light” are even more compelling when considering
whether to admit evidence of BCS to explain the psychological
effects of DAS on an abused child. As the Ohio Supreme Court in
&emeth explained that “it is difficult for the average person to
understand the degree of helplessness an abused child may feel.”293
In Janes, the Washington Supreme Court admitted expert
testimony regarding BCS explicitly to aid the jury in understanding
a “little-known psychological problem”294 that is “beyond the average jury’s understanding.”295 The Janes court elaborated on the
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necessity for the jury to hear expert testimony regarding BCS as follows:
Without the aid of expert testimony on the psychology of
battered children, the jury will be unable to appreciate the
manner in which the abused child differs from the
unabused child. Specifically, the jury will be uninformed
as to the difference in the way battered children perceive
things in their immediate surroundings and react to those
perceptions.296
The unique perceptions of an abused child will also enable
the jury to fully comprehend how a child would know that he or she
was in danger of death or serious bodily injury, even if the child was
not actively suffering abuse at the time the parricide occurred.
The court explained that
expert testimony regarding “hypervigilance” and “hypermonitoring” help juries to fully comprehend that battered
children are capable of detecting imminent harm more
readily than unabused children, who are less acutely
aware of their environment.. . . Hypervigilance enables a
child to “notice a change in the usual pattern of abuse
which would be almost imperceptible to one who has not
been abused. This, in turn may suggest to the victim of
abuse a level of immediate and acute danger very different from that perceived by one not continuously exposed
to an abusive environment.”297
The child’s unique perception of danger may also help a jury to
understand why the child might have a violent reaction to an ostensibly non-confrontational setting, even though the child has not
reacted with violence in the past to confrontational settings.298
Very Few Jurors Have Been Battered Children
There are some legal experts who opine that, although
expert testimony regarding battered woman’s syndrome is necessary to counter the common sense conclusion of jurors that a reasonable woman would have left the abusive situation, this need does
not apply in the case of a battered child. The rationale for this view
is that the vast majority of jurors have not been battered adults and,
without the expert testimony, could not understand why a grown
woman would choose to remain in an abusive situation, especially
with the availability of support services. However, because every
juror has been a child, who has been dependent on a parent or
guardian to provide for their care, the inability of a child to leave his
or her home is within the common experience of the jury and expert
testimony regarding BCS is not required for the jury to fully understand the child’s situation.
This rationale misses some crucial aspects of why expert
testimony is necessary to help jurors understand the perspective of
a battered child. Even if lay jurors might have experienced and,
therefore, might be able to understand the financial support that a
child receives from his or her parents, this does not mean that expert
testimony is not needed. Financial dependence is only a part of the
explanation for why a battered child does not leave an abusive
home. Expert testimony is needed to assist lay jurors in fully comprehending the strong psychological and emotional reasons that
keep a battered child from seeking help or escaping from the abuser. This is also the reason why simply hearing extensive testimony
from the child regarding the kinds of abuse that the child has suffered is not enough to understand the child’s perspective. It is not
the fact that the child has been abused, or even the physical effect of
that abuse, that expert testimony will help the jury understand.
Rather, it is the psychological effect of the abuse that makes expert
testimony necessary. As the Ohio Supreme Court explained in
&emeth, “[p]rolonged exposure to abuse results in feelings of pow-
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erlessness, embarrassment, fear of reprisal, isolation, and low selfesteem….These effects often prevent a child from seeking help
from third parties.”299 Although all jurors have been children, the
vast majority of jurors have not been abused children and their common experience does not include knowledge of the psychological
characteristics of a battered child.
Moreover, the fact that battered children grow up in an
environment “wholly different from the safe and nurturing home
depicted by traditional values and social expectations” seems to
confirm that BCS is, fortunately, beyond the common experiences
most jurors have encountered.300 Children who spend their formative years in unsafe, abusive homes often find it nearly impossible
to develop any non-violent methods of problem solving. In Janes,
the Washington Supreme Court explained that, “unlike an adult who
may come into a battering relationship with at least some basis on
which to make comparisons between current and past experiences,
a child has no such equivalent life experience on which to draw to
put the battering into perspective.”301 Usually, such children have
seen only violence used to solve problems in the home, and
“[u]nlike the battered adult, [have] no outside context with which to
compare the abusive reality.”302 Because abused children are
unaware of other problem-solving methods, they begin to pattern
their behavior after that of their abusive parents. This effect of
growing up in a violent environment may help the jury understand
why abused children might resort to using violence against their
abusers rather than leaving the abusive situation or reporting the
abuse.303
Unfortunately, this effect also often results in battered children becoming violent youths and adults. A number of studies have
shown a marked correlation between physical abuse as a child and
violent behavior in youth and adulthood. For example, according to
a 2005 study by the Children’s Defense Fund, abused and neglected children are up to six times as likely to engage in delinquent
behavior as juveniles and up to three times as likely to be arrested
as adults than non-abused and neglected children.304 Robert W.
Ten Bensel has written that “studies have indicated a 100 percent
correlation between [physical] child abuse and deviant behavior
among violent juvenile delinquents, adults who had committed violent crimes and who were in San Quentin Prison, and all assassins
and people who had attempted assassinations without success in the
United States in the past 20 years.”305 According to another study,
an abused child’s chances of becoming an abusive adult are “in
some instances a thousand times greater than an un-abused
child.”306
Very Few Battered Children Can Provide Corroborating Testimony
Regarding Their Abuse
Expert testimony regarding battered child syndrome may
also be necessary to establish that the abuse could have occurred
without anyone outside of the immediate family knowing about it.
Unlike a battered woman, who may be able to corroborate her physical abuse by the testimony of other witnesses, in most cases an
abused child will not be able to provide any similar corroborating
testimony. As the Utah court noted in State v. Tanner, “Where there
is child abuse, there will invariably be secrecy. The great disparity
of power and control between the abuser and the child assures that
there will be little, if any, direct evidence.”307 The Ohio Supreme
Court in &emeth further explained:
The abusive parent…generally becomes adept at concealing the abuse from outsiders….The effects of abuse
thereby diminish the likelihood that the defense will be
able to present corroborating testimony of third parties.
Absent corroborating evidence, a trier of fact is likely to
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believe that the abuse allegations are fabricated in
response to the charges levied against the child-defendant.308
Indeed, the &emeth court made it clear that “[i]t is the lack
of corroborating evidence that makes expert testimony even more
crucial” since the “defense needs expert testimony to refute the
seemingly logical conclusion that serious abuse could not be taking
place if no one outside the home was aware of it.”309
Compounding the problem is the fact that a battered child
will frequently maintain the secrecy and remain silent about both
the fact that the abuse is occurring and the identity of the perpetrator.310 Battered children are often directly threatened by their
abusers regarding the consequences of telling anyone about the
abuse. “Abusers may tell children that if they ever tell anyone they
will be beaten or killed or some other family member may be
harmed.”311 Moreover, because of the abusers’ threats, “[e]ven
when the abuse has been reported and social services and juvenile
courts have become involved, the full extent of the abuse suffered
by a child may be unknown because of these fears.”312
Expert Testimony Regarding the Psychological Impact of
Domestic Abuse Syndrome Has High Probative Value Which
Is "ot Outweighed By Any Prejudicial Effect

The Probative Value Of Expert Testimony Regarding The
Psychological Impact Of Domestic Abuse Syndrome On Women
Since one of the requirements for the admission of expert
testimony is that its probative value is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect, all of the courts that have admitted expert testimony
regarding battered woman’s syndrome have had to either explicitly
or implicitly reach this conclusion.313 In fact, these courts have
repeatedly recognized that expert testimony regarding BWS is
essential since the “state of mind” of the defendant is a “critical
issue” and the defendant’s actions need to be explained “in light of
[her] knowledge concerning the victim.”314 For that reason “[t]he
victim’s reputation for violence, prior ‘assaults, and other circumstances [are] relevant to interpreting the attacker’s behavior.’”315
Such considerations “illuminate and reflect on the reasonableness
of defendant’s perception of both the imminence of danger and the
need to resist with the degree of force applied.”316
The Probative Value Of Expert Testimony Regarding The
Psychological Impact Of Domestic Abuse Syndrome On Children
Like expert testimony regarding the psychological impact
of domestic abuse syndrome on battered women, similar evidence
on behalf of battered children has high probative value and is not
outweighed by any prejudicial effect. There are two main concerns
regarding the potential prejudicial effects of expert testimony
regarding the battered child syndrome. Neither of these concerns is
sufficiently prejudicial that it should outweigh the high probative
value of expert testimony regarding the psychological effects of
DAS on children.
The first concern is that expert testimony regarding battered child’s syndrome will lead the jury to develop animosity
towards the abusive parent, shifting the jury’s attention from the
proper inquiry of whether the child was justified in killing the parent to the irrelevant issue of the parent’s relative worth as a mother
or father. This concern was expressed by the Wyoming Supreme
Court in refusing to admit expert testimony regarding battered
child’s syndrome in State v. Jahnke.317 In that case, from the time
sixteen-year-old Richard Jahnke was a baby, his father beat him
“regularly and unmercifully” until Richard ultimately shot his
father to death.318 In addition, the father also beat Richard’s sister
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and his mother.319 In discussing the evidence establishing that the
“deceased father [was] a cruel, sadistic and abusive man”, the court
commented that “[d]efense witnesses had a motive to make the
deceased look like a bad man; they wanted to make the jury believe
that [the] father deserved to be executed.”320 Thus the concern arises that the jury may rule on the improper basis of animosity towards
the parent and sympathy towards the child.
Clearly, if this concern has any merit, it applies with equal
force to battered woman’s syndrome and does not explain why a
court that admits expert testimony regarding BWS would not admit
expert testimony regarding BCS..321 Moreover, in both cases, it
seems cruelly ironic to essentially be arguing that, because a parent
was so abusive that a jury may feel animosity towards the batterer,
that evidence should be kept from the jury. It seems as though the
court would be rewarding abusive parents for their bad conduct by
keeping their behavior from the jury, while punishing the battered
child by not giving the jury all of the information which might assist
them in determining why the child might have been acting in self
defense in killing the abusive parent.
Moreover, the results of a 1996 U.S. Department of Justice
study of both state and federal cases involving battered women
should help allay any potential concerns that admitting expert testimony regarding domestic abuse syndrome would mean that the
abused women and children would not be convicted or that any convictions would be overturned on appeal. The study analyzed the
state court appeals of 152 battered women who were convicted of
killing their abusive partners.322 On appeal, 63% of the convictions
or sentences were affirmed.323 This result occurred even though
expert testimony regarding BWS was admitted in 71% of the affirmances.324 Similarly, 75% of the appeals in federal court resulted
in affirmances of the battered women’s convictions or sentences.325
The researchers considered these findings “strong evidence that,
contrary to the contention of some critics, admitting expert testimony on battering and its effects, is not tantamount to an acquittal.”326
Although their study involved expert testimony regarding battered
women, there seems to be little doubt that a similar study regarding
expert testimony about battered child syndrome, would lead to the
same results.
The second concern regarding the prejudicial effect of
expert testimony regarding battered child’s syndrome is that the testimony will impermissibly infringe on the role of the jury in determining the child’s credibility.327 Some courts have opined that, if
an expert testifies to the same facts as the abused child and explains
them using technical terms like “learned helplessness” and “hypervigilance”, the child’s testimony may be bolstered and embellished
with an “aura of special reliability and trustworthiness”328 making
it more likely that the jury will believe the child.
The reasoning behind this concern seems circular and misguided. Part of the reason why courts allow expert testimony in the
first place is precisely because experts have specialized knowledge
which jurors can rely on to reach their verdicts. It is axiomatic to
say that, because jurors might rely on the testimony, it should be
excluded. If this was the case, then all expert testimony would
either need to be excluded or the jury would need to be told not to
rely on the testimony, in which case it would be hard to fathom why
the testimony was admitted in the first place.
In addition, the jury can, and should, make an independent
judgment regarding the credibility of the child. A number of cases
have held that an expert may not vouch for the credibility of a witness, such as by testifying that a particular child is capable of
telling, or is actually telling, the truth. For example, in ruling that
expert testimony regarding BCS was admissible, the Ohio Supreme
Court in &emeth explicitly stated: “We have held that an expert
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may not offer an opinion as to ´the truth of a child’s statement.
However, an expert may provide testimony that supports the truth
of the facts testified to by the child, or which assists the fact finder
in assessing the child’s veracity.´”329 Consequently, most experts
only testify about the parameters of the battered child syndrome
rather than testifying as to whether a particular child’s testimony
was credible. Thus, the effect of the expert testimony may “bolster”
a child’s testimony to the extent that it makes the child’s familial situation not unbelievable; however, only the jury can determine
whether a particular child’s story about his or her familial situation
is believable.330
Developing Acceptable Legal Standards For Self-Defense Pleas
By Victims of Domestic Abuse Syndrome

Overview
Killing in self-defense is permitted when there is “reasonable ground” to believe that great bodily injury or death is threatened and there is “imminent danger” of the threat “being accomplished.”331 Thus, self defense requires that the defendant have an
actual (or “genuine” or “honest”) belief of imminent danger of
death or great bodily injury, that the defendant’s acts were necessary
to prevent the harm and that “`a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have had the same perception and done the same
acts.’”332
In the traditional confrontational setting, a majority of
jurisdictions apply an objective standard of reasonableness in establishing justification for homicide and reject a purely subjective standard whether the defendant has been the prior victim of abuse by the
decedent or not.333 In most cases involving DAS victims who kill
their abusers in a confrontational setting, this standard of reasonableness is sufficient to assure that the battered women or children
can establish a self defense plea.
However, in a non-confrontational setting, such as where
the abusers are passive or asleep, a hybrid standard of reasonableness, which combines both a subjective prong and an objective
prong, is essential to assure that the psychological effects of DAS
can be properly considered by a jury. The subjective prong of the
hybrid standard assures that the jury can understand the perception
of DAS victims when evaluating whether they were justified in
killing their abusers. The objective prong provides an external criterion against which the reasonableness of the defensive actions of
DAS victims can be measured.
In addition, in a non-confrontational setting, the time
frame in which DAS victims must fear grievous bodily harm in
order to plead self defense must be broadly construed. The use of an
expansive time frame enables the jury to consider the unique ability of DAS victims to anticipate severe attacks by their abusers when
evaluating whether the danger from the abuser was immediate or
imminent.
An Objective Standard of Reasonableness For Victims of
Domestic Abuse Syndrome Who Claim Self-Defense In a
Confrontational Context
In a traditional confrontational context, an objective standard of reasonableness is usually sufficient to assure that domestic
abuse syndrome victims can establish their self-defense pleas. The
California Supreme Court explained in Humphrey why expert testimony regarding BWS (and, by analogy, BCS) might not be necessary in this type of setting:
In many circumstances, BWS will be irrelevant to the
question of objective reasonableness because the facts
raise a traditional and therefore readily assessable selfdefense claim, for example, when the victim threatens or
approaches the defendant with a gun or knife or when the
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two struggle over a weapon following a threat or other
hostile act by the victim. In such “classic” confrontations, “[f]ear is a common human emotion within the
understanding of a jury and hence expert psychiatric
explanation is not necessary.”334
It is estimated that about 75% of the cases involving a battered woman killing her abusive spouse occur in a confrontational
setting “where the [homicide] victim was usually the initial aggressor who provoked the final confrontation that ended up lethal.”335
In these cases, even if a court admits expert testimony regarding
DAS, it would do so only to establish the woman or child’s subjective honesty in believing that he or she was in danger of grievous
bodily harm at the time of the homicide.336 However, the court
would not admit the expert testimony to establish the objective reasonableness of the woman or child’s defensive actions. As the North
Dakota Supreme Court explained in State v. Leidholm, “an objective
standard of reasonableness requires the factfinder to view the circumstances surrounding the accused at the time he used force from
the standpoint of a hypothetical reasonable and prudent person.”
Ordinarily, under such a view, the unique physical and psychological characteristics of the accused are not taken into consideration in
judging the reasonableness of the accused’s belief.337
Using A Hybrid Standard of Reasonableness
Overview
Unlike battered women who frequently kill their abusive
spouses in a confrontational setting, most battered children kill their
abusive parents in non-confrontational settings. According to the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Smullen:
[M]ost killings by abused children occur in non-confrontational settings . . . ‘typically . . .when the parent is
in his least defensible position, thus increasing the child’s
chance of success. The circumstances of the killing, in
fact, often suggest an ambush, with the parent sleeping,
coming in the front door, watching TV, or cooking dinner
with their back turned when attacked. Rarely is the parent ever killed while beating, or for that matter, yelling at
the child.’338
In cases involving victims of DAS who kill their abusers
in a non-confrontational setting, there is a three way split of authority as to what standard of reasonableness should be applied. A
majority of courts use the same objective standard of reasonableness, described above, that they would use if the killing occurred in
a traditional confrontational setting.339 A few courts apply a purely
subjective standard of reasonableness.340 The Leidholm court
explained that under “the subjective standard the issue is not
whether the circumstances attending the accused’s use of force
would be sufficient to create in the mind of a reasonable and prudent person the belief that the use of force is necessary to protect
himself against immediate unlawful harm, but rather whether the
circumstances are sufficient to induce in the accused an honest and
reasonable belief that he must use force to defend himself against
imminent harm.341 In explaining the difference between a subjective and an objective test, the Leidholm court stated:
The significance of the difference in viewing circum
stances from the standpoint of the “defendant alone”
rather than from the standpoint of a “reasonably cautious
person” is that the jury’s consideration of the unique
physical and psychological characteristics of an accused
allows the jury to judge the reasonableness of the
accused’s actions against the accused’s subjective impres
sions of the need to use force rather than against those
impressions which a jury determines that a hypothetical
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reasonably cautious person would have under similar cir
cumstances.”342
Finally, a more limited number of courts employ an objective-subjective “hybrid” standard of reasonableness, meaning that
expert testimony regarding domestic abuse syndrome is admissible
as part of the subjective circumstances in evaluating whether the
battered woman or child was acting in an objectively reasonable
manner, in other words whether a “reasonable and prudent [domestic abuse victim] would have believed serious bodily injury or death
was imminent.”343 For example, in Richardson, a battered woman
stabbed to death her boyfriend, who had beaten her and threatened
to kill her throughout their relationship of several years.344 In
reversing her conviction for second degree reckless homicide, the
Wisconsin Appellate Court explained that the trial court should
have used a hybrid standard of reasonableness since the “confrontational nature of an incident where a battered woman kills her abuser might only become apparent when viewed in the context of a pattern of violent behavior rather than an isolated incident.”345
Evaluating Whether The Women Or Children Were Acting In
Objectively Reasonable Manners
There are valid reasons for imposing a hybrid standard,
which incorporates both the subjective and the objective standards
of reasonableness, to prove self-defense in a non-confrontational
setting regarding both women and children who are victims of
domestic abuse syndrome. As the Leidholm court noted, in a case
where a severely battered woman stabbed her husband with a butcher knife while he slept: “[A] correct statement of the law of selfdefense is one in which the court directs the jury to assume the
physical and psychological properties peculiar to the accused . . .
and then decide whether or not the particular circumstances surrounding the accused at the time [s]he used force were sufficient to
create in [her] mind a sincere and reasonable belief that the use of
force was necessary to protect [her]self from imminent and unlawful harm.” 346
The South Dakota Supreme Court in Burtzlaff further
explained to a jury how it should apply the objective and subjective
prongs of the hybrid standard in the context of battered women:
In the case wherein the “Battered Woman Syndrome” is
raised, and if you in fact find that defendant is a battered
woman, you are to look at the evidence presented through
the eyes of a reasonable and prudent battered woman. If
a reasonable and prudent battered woman would have
believed serious bodily injury or death was imminent,
then the killing was lawful. But, if you find that a reasonable and prudent battered woman would not have
believed serious bodily injury or death imminent, then the
killing was unlawful.347
The Washington Supreme Court in Allery further
explained that a jury must evaluate “the justification of self-defense
from the defendant’s point of view as conditions appeared to her at
the time of the act . . . . In no other way could the jury safely say
what a reasonably prudent [woman] similarly situated would have
done.”348
Similarly, in the case of an abused child, the expert testimony helps the jury understand the child’s perceptions and what the
defendant, as a battered child, knows and perceives. As the
Washington Supreme Court noted in adopting a hybrid standard in
Janes: “By evaluating the evidence from the standpoint of a reasonably prudent person, knowing all the defendant knows and seeing
all the defendant sees, our approach to reasonableness incorporates
both subjective and objective characteristics.”349 It is subjective in
that the jury is entitled to “`stand as nearly as practicable in the
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shoes of [the] defendant, and from this point of view determine the
character of the act.’”350 The court explained that the subjective
component ensures that the jury considers the child’s “actions in
light of all the facts and circumstances known to the [child], even
those substantially predating the killing.”351 The objective portion
allows the jury to “use this information in determining `what a reasonably prudent [child] similarly situated would have done.’”352
The Subjective Prong Enables A Jury To Consider Whether Victims
Of Domestic Abuse Syndrome Were Justified In Killing Their
Abusers
The subjective prong of the hybrid standard is essential to
place the jury in the position of the DAS victim, so that the jury can
“then properly assess the reasonableness of the defendant’s perceptions of imminence and danger.”353 Traditional self-defense law is
premised on isolated encounters between two strangers; a situation
where no history exists and no connection needs to be made
between an abusive past and a violent response. However, this is
not the situation where the defendant has a prolonged history of
abuse by the decedent. An abusive family is by definition an unreasonable situation. Battered women have frequently suffered from
years of abuse which resulted in the psychological effects detailed
above. Battered children, who have often been abused since infancy, have never had the opportunity to develop the perspective of the
“objectively reasonable person” because they have never experienced a “normal” person’s reaction to danger. Thus, they have no
basis for understanding what a “reasonable” reaction to threats on
their lives would be. “Because the abused child’s psyche has been
altered by physical, sexual or emotional abuse, it is inappropriate to
judge the child’s fear [solely] against the rational person standard.”354
Imposing a purely objective standard of reasonableness
and refusing to admit the expert testimony regarding the subjective
perspective of a victim of domestic abuse syndrome would thus
mean that the jury would have to disregard this crucial evidence of
years of abuse in the case of a battered woman or, perhaps, a lifetime of abuse in the case of a battered child.355 Rather than looking
at the facts that occurred immediately prior to the killing with the
same understanding as the battered woman or child, the jury would
have to look at the same facts from the perspective of a detached
reasonable person. This might make sense in the traditional situation where the defendant was, in fact, a detached person, and the
only issue was whether the actions of that detached person were reasonable; however, it makes no sense where the defendant was anything but a detached person and where the actions of that person can
only be fairly examined with the battered woman’s or child’s psychological background in mind.
Viewing the actions of the battered woman or child from
this perspective “might enlighten the jury’s assessment of a reasonable person’s perceptions as well.”356 The Washington Supreme
Court in Janes explained that, “by learning of the defendant’s perceptions and the circumstances surrounding the act, the jury is able
to make the `critical determination of the degree of force which...a
reasonable person in the same situation...seeing what he sees and
knowing what he knows, then would believe to be necessary.’”357
Justice Rose, dissenting in Jahnke explained that,
[If a jury is]…deprived of an expert’s explanation of how
battered people perceive and respond to the imminence of
danger, [the jury] could not be expected to understand
and quantify the impact and residuals of the years and
years of battering which had been the lifelong fate of [the
abused youth]. The jury could, therefore, not know - or
be expected to know - whether his acts...were those of the
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reasonable person similarly situated for whom the law of
self-defense provides comfort.358
As the New Mexico Appellate Court explained in
Gallegos: “The subjective perceptions of an individual, brutalized
regularly by domestic violence are especially critical to the determination of whether her actions in purported self-defense were reasonable. . . .To require the battered person to await a blatant, deadly
assault before she can act in defense of herself would not only
ignore unpleasant reality, but would amount to sentencing her to
‘murder by installment.’”359
Thus, the admission of expert testimony to support the
subjective reasonableness of defendant’s actions is not an attempt to
establish what the Jahnke court called a “special justification for
patricide” (or for killing an abusive spouse or partner).360 Rather,
the evidence simply provides a framework for understanding why
the abused person found it impossible to survive without killing.361
This would not mean that any abuse victim who kills his or her
abuser, no matter how irrational and unreasonable that act may have
been, is justified. As the South Dakota Supreme Court made clear
in Burtzlaff, involving a battered woman who used a shotgun to kill
her husband while he was sitting on the couch, a “battered spouse
does not possess a license to kill the batterer….”362 Rather, it
remains for the jury to decide whether or not, as a battered person,
the defendant behaved reasonably in the self-defense context.
The Purpose Of The Objective Prong
The objective prong of a hybrid standard “serves the crucial function” of providing the jury with an external criterion
against which a battered person’s reasonableness can be measured.”363 This assures that the jury will assess the subjective perceptions and actions of victims of domestic abuse syndrome through
the prism of an objective standard of reasonableness. As the
Washington Supreme Court stated in Janes, “Without [such an
objective standard], a jury would be forced to evaluate the defendant’s actions in the vacuum of the defendant’s own subjective perceptions. In essence, self-defense would always justify homicide so
long as the defendant was true to his or her own internal beliefs.”364
Moreover, the court felt that applying “a purely subjective standard
in all cases would give free reign to the short-tempered, the pugnacious, and the foolhardy who see threats of harm where the rest of
us would not and who blind themselves to opportunities for escape
that seem plainly available.”365
The objective portion of a hybrid standard also promotes
the goals of the self-defense doctrine by protecting the sanctity of
human life and limiting self-help.366 In State v. &orman, the North
Carolina Supreme Court explained the need for an objective standard of reasonableness in the context of a battered wife: “The
killing of another human being is the most extreme recourse to our
inherent right of self-preservation and can be justified in law only
by the utmost real or apparent necessity brought about by the decedent.”367 The goals of protecting human life and limiting self-help
might be subverted if a purely subjective standard of reasonableness
were applied. This concern was sufficiently important to the
&orman court that it affirmed the voluntary manslaughter conviction of Judy Norman, a battered wife who killed her husband while
he was sleeping, since there was no evidence that the wife “reasonably believed that she was confronted by a threat of imminent death
or great bodily harm.”368 This decision was reached despite the
wife’s twenty year history of physical and mental abuse at the hands
of her husband.369 His physical abuse included “slapping [her],
punching and kicking her, striking her with various objects . . .
throwing glasses, beer bottles and other objects at her . . . putting his
cigarettes out on her, breaking glass against her face and crushing

Spring 2009

food on her face.”370 In terms of emotional abuse, because he did
not work, he “forced her to make money by prostitution, and . . .
made humor of that fact to family and friends, . . . on a few occasions made her eat pet food out of the pet’s bowls and bark like a
dog, . . . made her sleep on the floor [and] deprived her of food.”371
Similar concerns with promoting the goals of self defense
led the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Stewart to reject a purely
subjective standard of reasonableness, despite the same kind of horrendous prior abuse as was evident in the &orman case, noting that
to “hold otherwise would, in effect, allow the execution of the abuser for past or future acts or conduct.”372 The Stewart case also
involved a husband, with “a long history of abuse” of his wife and
two stepdaughters, who was asleep when he was shot and killed by
his battered wife. Like Judy Norman, Peggy Stewart was abused
both physically and psychologically. For example, her husband
“once kicked Peggy so violently in the chest and ribs that she
required hospitalization.”373 On another occasion, he held a shotgun to Peggy’s head and threatened to kill her.374 Moreover, on one
Thanksgiving, he “threw the turkey dinner to the floor, chased
Peggy outside, grabbed her by the hair, rubbed her face in the dirt
and then kicked and beat her.”375 Finally, he once ordered Peggy to
kill and bury her twelve year old daughter.376 The objective portion
of the hybrid standard assures that the killing of another human
being will only be justified when it results from the “utmost real or
apparent necessity.”377
A Broad Time Frame For Victims of Domestic Abuse Syndrome
Who Claim Self Defense
Most justifiable homicide statutes include the terms
“imminent” or “immediate” to describe the time frame in which the
defendant must fear grievous bodily harm in order to claim self
defense. At the present time, there is a split of authority as to
whether justifiable homicide, in the context of a victim of DAS who
kills his or her abuser, requires that the terms immediate or imminent be narrowly defined, as meaning something happening right
away, or more broadly defined, as meaning something that might or
is about to occur.378
Jurisdictions which define the terms narrowly refuse to
permit self-defense instructions where a victim of domestic abuse
syndrome kills his or her abuser during a pause in the violence, feeling that a narrow time frame best comports with the traditional policy that self-defense in a homicide case should only be allowed in
the most dire circumstances.379 These courts opine that holding that
the use of deadly force is justified by a danger of death or serious
injury that is merely about to occur is equivalent to holding such
force is justified even when it is not absolutely necessary.380 For
example in Langley v. State, the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed a wife’s conviction of second degree murder for
shooting her drunken, abusive husband while he sat on a couch,
despite the husband’s “cussing” her and demanding that she leave
even if her “G__damned feet have to go first.”381 In reaching this
conclusion, the court noted that “[h]owever discreditable the victim’s conduct may have been on the occasion of his death, he did
not by word or conduct pose immediate danger to the life or limb”
of his wife.382
Even if the Alabama court was correct that the abused wife
was not endangered at that very moment, what the court failed to
recognize is abuse victims can recognize the signals from their
abuser that mean they will be in danger at the very next moment.
As Justice Brown pointed out in his concurring opinion in
Humphrey, “even if the woman kills her husband when he is only
threatening her, rather than actually beating her, she knows from
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past experience that he is not merely making idle comments but is
fully capable of carrying out his threats. Thus, the battered woman
may reasonably fear imminent danger from her husband when others unfamiliar with the history of abuse would not.”383 He concluded that, on “the basis of her experience, a battered woman may thus
be ‘better able to predict the likely degree of violence in any particular battering incident’ and in turn may more precisely assess the
measure and speed of force necessary to resist.”384 Justice Brown’s
conclusion would be equally applicable even if the abuser was
asleep or incapacitated. As previously noted, victims of domestic
abuse syndrome “`have a unique ability to predict when abusive
behavior is imminent and may be able to recognize the subtle signs
that usually precede a severe beating.’”385
Once expert testimony is admitted to illuminate this characteristic of hypermonitoring, the jury will be able to understand
how, even in an ostensibly non-confrontational situation, the DAS
victim can honestly and reasonably believe that the abusive spouse
or parent poses an imminent threat of grievous bodily harm.386
Understanding a domestic abuse syndrome victim’s “acute discriminatory powers,” would therefore give the jury a basis for recognizing how, at the time of the killing, the abuser’s violence had, “in the
[DAS victim’s] mind, passed from the ‘normal’ and tolerable into
the ‘abnormal’ and life threatening.”387 Use of a broader time frame
is, thus, essential to enable the jury to consider the domestic abuse
syndrome victim’s unique ability to anticipate that grievous harm
from the abuser is, in fact, immediate or imminent.388
The Heightened State of Terror Of Victims Of Domestic Abuse
Syndrome
The use of a broad time frame will also enable juries to
consider the domestic abuse syndrome victim’s build up of terror
and fear that DAS victims experience as a result of the prolonged
history of abuse. For example, in State v. Hundley, Betty Hundley’s
“build up of terror and fear” extended throughout her “tumultuous”
ten year marriage to Carl Hundley.389 Over the years, Carl
“knocked out several of [Betty’s] teeth, broke[ ] her nose at least
five times and threatened to cut her eyeballs out and her head
off.”390 He also “kicked Betty down the stairs on numerous occasions and had repeatedly broken her ribs.”391 In addition, Carl prevented Betty, who was diabetic, from taking “her required dosage of
insulin on numerous occasions by hiding it or diluting the insulin
with water” causing Betty to go into diabetic coma on these occasions.392 Approximately six weeks before his death, Carl knocked
Betty down, kicked her and choked her into unconsciousness.393
When Betty moved out, Carl “started a pattern of constant harassment,” calling her “night and day to threaten her life and those of
her family.”394 Ultimately, Carl broke down the door of the motel
room where Betty was staying, choked her, raped her and threatened her life.395 When Betty pulled a gun out of her purse, and
demanded that he leave, Carl “laughed tauntingly” and said “You
are dead, bitch now!”396 As he turned his back to her to reach for a
beer bottle, Betty shot him five times in the back.397 On appeal of
her conviction for involuntary manslaughter in the death of her husband, the Kansas Supreme Court adopted a broader time frame and
found reversible error in the trial court’s jury instruction that Betty’s
claim of self-defense required that Carl’s use of unlawful force be
“immediate” rather than “imminent.”398 The court concluded that
“the use of the word ‘immediate’ in the instruction on self-defense
places undue emphasis on the immediate action of the deceased,
and obliterates the nature of the buildup of terror and fear which
[has] been systematically created over a long period of time.”399 In
fact, the court held that the entire ten year history of Betty’s abuse
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by Carl was relevant in determining whether Betty reasonably
feared abuse from Carl and the imminence of that danger.400
Similarly, in Bechtel v. State, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals applied a broad time frame in a case where a battered woman shot her drunken husband following an argument.401
The shooting was preceded by at least twenty-three abusive incidents in which her husband “threw her into the windshield of his
boat”, “pound[ed] her head on the ground, wall, door, cabinet or
other available object” and grabbed her head by the hair and
slammed her into the [car] window.”402 In applying an expanded
time frame, the Bechtel court explained: “`The battered wife is constantly in a heightened state of terror because she is certain that one
day her husband will kill her during the course of a beating . . . .
Thus from the perspective of the battered wife, the danger is constantly immediate.’”403
Indeed, the “confrontational nature of an incident where a
battered woman kills her abuser might only become apparent when
viewed in the context of a pattern of violent behavior rather than as
an isolated incident.”404 As the Bechtel court made clear “the meaning of imminent must necessarily envelope the battered woman’s
perceptions based on all the facts and circumstances of her relationship with the victim. . . . And so, the issue is not whether the danger was in fact imminent but whether, given the circumstances as
she perceived them, the defendant’s belief was reasonable that the
danger was imminent.”405
Indeed, the build-up of terror and fear, coupled with the
ability of DAS victims to predict the future behavior of their
abusers, may make a homicide justifiable even if it is committed
after a prolonged interval between the active abuse and the killing.
In Janes, the Washington Supreme Court made it clear that even if
“the triggering behavior and the abusive episode are divided by
time [that] does not necessarily negate the reasonableness of the
defendant’s perception of imminent harm.”406 The Janes court
explained that, to a battered child, “[e]ven an otherwise innocuous
comment which occurred days before the homicide could be highly
relevant when the evidence shows that such a comment inevitably
signaled the beginning of an abusive episode.”407 Thus, when the
defendant is a victim of DAS a broad definition of the time frame is
essential to permit the jury to consider the ability of a battered person to anticipate grievous harm from the abuser in the future.408
Moreover, the jurisdictions that require a narrow time
frame fail to recognize that it is only when the abuser is incapacitated that a battered person may have an opportunity to fight back.
This is especially true of abused children, who are “generally
unable to protect themselves during a confrontation, because of
obvious physical and less apparent psychological reasons. If they
are to be able to relieve themselves of their plight, the most inappropriate time may be during a beating.”409 It is only by using a broad
time frame that a jury can consider a child’s history of abuse and the
build-up of fear and terror that culminate in the need to commit parricide before the violence escalates and the child becomes the homicide victim.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Bechtel graphically
explained the necessity of allowing a broad time frame in a nonconfrontational context by analogizing the life of a victim of
domestic abuse syndrome to the “classic hostage situation in that
the battered [person] lives under long-term, life-threatening conditions in constant fear of another eruption of violence.”410
The court described a scenario where the captor threatens to kill the
hostage in three days, and the hostage is able to kill the captor on
the first day when an opportunity arises.411 The court concluded that
a “literal application of the requirement that the threat be imminent
would prevent the hostage from using deadly force until the captor
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is standing over him with a knife.”412 The court made it clear that
the perspective of a hostage is similar to the perception of a battered
person; in that “the next attack, which could be fatal or cause serious bodily harm, is imminent.”413 To require battered women and
children to wait for a deadly assault before they can act in selfdefense would, indeed, amount to sentencing all victims of DAS to
“`murder by installment’”414 at the hands of their abusers.
Conclusion
The plight of a victim of domestic abuse syndrome, who is
denied the opportunity to describe the devastating psychological
impact of the battering they have endured by presenting expert testimony regarding domestic abuse syndrome, was poignantly
described by Wyoming Supreme Court Justice Brown, specially
concurring, in the Jahnke case:
Denied the explanatory assistance of a qualified expert
witness, it is as though Richard Jahnke had not been permitted to defend himself at all. . . . [H]ow could this
young boy structure an understandable defense when –
even though the record discloses that since age two he
had been bullied, battered, frightened and emotionally
traumatized – he was, nevertheless, denied the opportunity to have explained to his jury how abused people reasonably handle their fears and anxieties – what their
apprehensions are – how, in the dark moments of their
aloneness, they perceive the imminence of danger – and
how, in response, they undertake to assert their right of
self-defense.415
Richard Jahnke, and the other women and children whose
tragic lives have been described above, have all been brutally
abused by the very people who should have provided them with
love and support – their mothers and fathers and spouses and
boyfriends. Many of them have suffered their abuse in silence –
afraid to confide in friends and family for fear of reprisals.
When they have tried to obtain the help they needed from police or
child protection agencies, who should protect and assist them, they
have often been rebuffed or worse, returned to their abusers.
As the Kansas Supreme Court noted in Hundley, “The horrible
beatings they are subjected to brainwash them into believing there
is nothing they can do. They live in constant fear of another eruption of violence. They become disturbed persons from the torture.”416
Often living in poverty, and lacking any financial
resources, most victims of domestic abuse syndrome come to feel
that they are trapped into remaining with their abusers.
When in desperation, often after many years of abuse, they take
matters into their own hands and kill their abusers, they are silenced
victims once again if they are unable to get the expert help they
need to present their stories and the psychological impact that a lifetime of abuse has had on them.
This final victimization can be prevented by allowing
expert testimony regarding domestic abuse syndrome. Obviously,
in the ideal world the battering would never have been allowed to
escalate to the point where killing the abuser would appear to be the
only way out to the abuse victim. In the ideal world, the war on
poverty would be won and the abject poverty that makes leaving the
abuser an economic impossibility for domestic violence victims
would no longer exist. But these abused women and children do not
live in an ideal world. At least, by allowing them to present expert
testimony about their abuse, these victims of DAS can be provided
with a just world, where the psychological impact of their years of
suffering is considered and where they will receive the fair trial that
every defendant deserves.
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A.E. Waller et al., Childhood Injury Deaths: &ational Analysis and Geographic Variations, 79

AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 310, 310 (1989) (noting that, as of 1989, child abuse was the leading
reason for injury-related deaths of babies under one year of age).

8 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., ADMINISTRATION ON CHILDREN,

YOUTH & FAMILIES, CHILD MALTREATMENT 1995 available at

injury, 16% of the victims who required medical care and 18% of the victims who missed at
15 Id.

16 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE,
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993-2001 (2003). Statistics from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation reveal that almost 9% of all homicide victims in the United States are killed by
their spouses. James A. Mercy & Linda E. Saltzman, Fatal Violence among Spouses in the

http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/ncands/table10.htm [hereinafter CHILD MAL-

United States, 1976-1985, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 595 (1989).

ing).

revealed that one-fourth of the women died by means of their abusers’ hands, fists or feet).

TREATMENT 1995] (victim data chart reporting 996 fatalities, with forty-five states report9 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., ADMINISTRATION ON CHILDREN,

YOUTH & FAMILIES, CHILD MALTREATMENT 2004 65 (2004), available at

http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm04/cm04.pdf [hereinafter CHILD MALTREAT-

MENT 2004] (estimating that 1,490 children died due to child abuse, with almost one-third of
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17 See Zorza, supra, note 1, at 390 (citing a study of homicides in Philadelphia which

18 JAMES ALLEN FOX & MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2002 UPDATE (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2004) available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/htus02.pdf.

19 See CHARLES PATRICK EWING, FATAL FAMILIES: THE DYNAMICS OF

INTRAFAMILIAL HOMICIDE 6 (1997) (noting that since 1976, between 1.5% and 2.5% of

94

all homicides in the United States have been parricides). The majority of these parricides are

psychiatrist that defendant, whose father and grandfather had been Holocaust survivors,

eighteen years. Susan C. Smith, Abused Children Who Kill Abusive Parents: Moving Toward

ble attempt to broaden the right of self defense . . .”). In addition to some of the syndromes

committed against their fathers by middle or upper class Caucasian males, aged sixteen to

an Appropriate Legal Response, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 141, 153 (1992)); Jamie Heather Sacks,
A &ew Age of Understanding: Allowing Self-Defense Claims For Battered Children Who Kill

Their Abusers, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y. 349, 358 (1994). Children who commit parricide were usually average to above-average students in school and typically had no

prior history of delinquency or violence. See Smith, supra; Kathleen M. Heide, WHY KIDS

KILL PARENTS: CHILD ABUSE AND HOMICIDE 154 (Sage ed. 1995).

showed some characteristics of Holocaust syndrome “was properly excluded as an impermissialready discussed in this article, Justice Teague mentioned the existence of the following additional “syndromes”: “The Familial Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome” (citing State v. Middleton,
657 P.2d 1215 (Or. 1983); “The Battle Fatigue Syndrome; ‘The Viet Nam Post-Traumatic

Stress Syndrome” (citing Miller v. State, 338 N.W.2d 673, 678 (S.D. 1983) (Henderson, J., dissenting) and State v. Felde, 422 So.2d 370 (La. 1982)); “The Policeman’s Syndrome” (citing
MARTIN BINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAW (2nd ed.

20 Nancy Blogett, Self Defense: Parricide Defendants Cite Sexual Abuse as Justification, AM.

1982); “The Post-Concussive Syndrome”; “The Whiplash Syndrome”; “The Low-Back

referred to by the term “parricide” or parent-killing, although the homicide victim is sometimes

P.2d 961 (Cal. 1970); “The Organic Delusional Syndrome” and “The Chronic Brain

B. ASS’N. J. 36 (June 1, 1987). For the sake of convenience, the cases in this article are

not a parent but instead is some other authority figure in the child’s home, such as the mother’s
live-in boyfriend.

21 See infra notes 123-125 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 237-239 and accompanying text.

23 See, e.g., Werner v. State, 711 S.W.2d 639, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (Teague, J., dissenting) (citing Steinmetz, THE BATTERED HUSBAND SYNDROME, VICTIMOLOGY, AN

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL (1977-1978) (noting that “The Battered Husband Syndrome” is
one of the labels used by psychiatrists)).

24 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss same-sex domestic violence in detail; however, it is clear that gays and lesbians also sometimes suffer domestic abuse from one another.
See, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Claiming A Domestic Sphere While
Risking &egative Stereotypes, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 325, 327 (1999) (citing a

1997 study by the National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs which estimated that between
25% and 33% of same-sex relationships involve physical or psychological abuse and noting

that this is comparable to estimates of the incidence of violence in opposite-sex relationships).
In 1994, the California Legislature, recognizing the need to have a gender neutral domestic

violence statute, made the so-called Spousal Abuse Statute applicable to gay men and lesbians

Syndrome”; “The Lover’s Syndrome”; “The Love Fear Syndrome” (citing People v. Terry, 466
Syndrome” (citing Illinois v. Reed, 290 N.E.2d 612 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972).

36 Werner, 711 S.W.2d at 649; see also, Latest Religious Messages, SAN JOSE MERCURY

NEWS, Feb. 4, 2007, at A2 (discussing a 2006 report from the Church of England warning that
the Church’s “‘feudal system’ bureaucracy” was creating an “‘irritable clergy syndrome’”

caused by priests being bothered by “‘having to be nice all the time to everyone, even when
confronted with extremes of nastiness,’ such as aggressive and neurotic parishioners”).
37

State v. Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d 1, 12 (SD 1992) (noting that even the “Bible provides that

a husband shall have dominion over his wife”).

38 See 1 William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 430,

(Univ. of Chicago Press 1st ed. 1765) (declaring that by marriage, the husband and wife are

“one person in law” such that the wife is “incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband”).

39 Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d at 12 (citing Joy Hannel, Note, Missouri Takes A Step Forward:
The Status of “Battered Spouse Syndrome” in Missouri, 56 MO. L. REV. 465, 468 (1991)).
40

Id.

42

Id.

41

Id.

by deleting the former requirement that cohabitants in an intimate relationship had to be “of the

43 LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (Harper 1979).

Crawford v. State, 404 A.3d 244, 246, 254 (Md. 1979) (reversing the conviction, based on the

45

opposite sex.” Spousal Abuse Statute, CAL. PEN. C. § 13701 (b) (West 1996); see also

44

Id.

Id.; see also People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 183 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Dr.

admission of potentially prejudicial recordings, where a woman stabbed her lesbian partner of

Lenore E. Walker (describing BWS as “`a pattern of psychological symptoms that develop

marijuana and interest in other women).

440 (Md. 2004) (identifying a “battered woman” as “one who is repeatedly subjected to any

six years sixty-five times with a kitchen knife due to the victim’s excessive drinking, use of
25 See infra at notes 126-28 and accompanying text.

26 See, e.g., State v. Janes, 850 P.2d 495, 500 (Wash. 1993) (admitting the expert testimony

from clinical psychologists to support the defense’s claim that prolonged child abuse impaired
the defendant’s capacity to premeditate the killing).

27 See infra at notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
28 See infra at notes 73-80 and accompanying text.

after somebody has lived in a battering relationship’”)); Maryland v. Smullen, 844 A.2d 429,
forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he
wants her to do without any concern for her rights”); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 371 (N.J.
1984) (defining BWS as a “series of common characteristics that appear in women who are

abused physically and psychologically over an extended period of time by the dominant male
figure in their lives”).

46 See Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 369, 379 (reversing the murder conviction of a woman whose

29 See infra at note 244 and accompanying text.

seven year marriage was punctuated by “periodic and frequent beatings, sometimes as often as

psychological response to a more general anxiety-related psychiatric disorder known as post-

tried to leave him”); People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 359, 362, 362 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985)

30 Technically the effect of such prolonged abuse of both adults and children is considered a
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Id. PTSD is caused by traumatic events or “extreme stres-

sors,” such as chronic child abuse, which are “outside the normal range of human experience.”
Janes, 850 P.2d at 501. Although PTSD is classified as a mental disorder, “it is one of the few
kinds of psychiatric disorders that is considered a normal response to an abnormal situation.”
Id. (quoting MONES, supra note 3, at 63).

31 See, e.g., Smith v. State, 688 P.2d 326, 327 (Nev. 1984) (affirming defendant’s conviction
of sexually assaulting his live-in girlfriend’s six-year-old daughter and holding that the trial

court did not err in admitting expert testimony regarding the dynamics of intra-familial child
sexual abuse because the testimony “would assist the jury in understanding the superficially
unusual behavior of the victim and her mother” in delaying reporting the abuse since the

“young victim often feels guilty about testifying against someone she loves” and the mother
“feels torn between her love for the child and her love for the father figure”); People v.

Benjamin R., 481 N.Y.S.2d 827, 832 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (affirming defendant’s conviction
for sodomy and sexual abuse of his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter and holding that the trial

court did not err in admitting expert testimony regarding intra-familial sexual abuse “to assist

the jury in determining what effect should be given the victim’s failure to make earlier disclosures” and that the expert testimony did not have “the effect of bolstering the victim’s version
of the events”).

32 See infra at notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
33

New York v. Colberg, 701 N.Y.S.2d 608, 609, 611 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); see also Smith

v. State, 486 S.E.2d 819, 822 n.3 (Ga. 1997) (recognizing, in a case involving a battered

woman, a “battered person syndrome” which might encompass the effects of battering on
women, men and children).

34 Werner v. State, 711 S.W.2d 639, 644 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (Teague, J., dissenting).

35 Cf. id. (affirming defendant’s murder conviction and holding that proffered testimony of a
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once a week” and accompanied by threats to kill her and “to cut off parts of her body if she

(battered woman shot her live-in boyfriend after suffering “prolonged physical and psychological maltreatment” over a ten year period consisting of her boyfriend’s “frequent beatings” and
menacing her with a knife and a pistol); People v. Emick, 418 N.Y.S.2d 552, 554, 557, 559
(N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (quoting Dr. Matilda Rice and describing incident where a woman’s

boyfriend physically abused her for one and a half years, including beating her with a bull-

whip “while she was hog-tied”, beating her on the head with a piece of wood, beating her head
against a tree and “stabb[ing] her foot with a pencil, which resulted in a visit to the hospital to
remove part of the pencil”); State v. Moore, 695 P.2d 985, 985-988 (Or. Ct. App. 1982)

(Newman, J., concurring) (woman shot her husband after suffering “long-standing physical,
sexual, and psychological abuse by her husband including injecting her with illicit drugs

against her will and threatening to sell her into prostitution in Mexico”); Commonwealth v.

Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 783-786 (Pa. 1989) (woman was physically and psychologically

abused by her boyfriend); State v. Furlough, 797 S.W.2d 631, 637, 651 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990)

(abused woman killed her husband after he verbally and physically assaulted her, including at

one time “attempt[ing] to smother her with a pillow and at another time plac[ing] a knife to her
throat”); Fielder v. State, 756 S.W.2d 309, 311, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (battered wife shot
her husband who had physically and sado-masochistically abused her, including “piercing her
genitals with a golden ring” and shackling her, which an expert witness said was within the
“98th percentile for severity of battering husbands”).

47 State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 971 (Ohio 1990).
48 Id.

49 Id. at 976.

50 Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 633 N.E.2d 1039, 1040 (Mass. 1994).
51 Id. at 1041.

52 Id. at 1042-1043.

Spring 2009

53 State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 795 (Minn. 1989).

occur in two or more episodes to which there are seldom any witnesses. In addi-

55 Id.

child. The harm often occurs when the child is in the exclusive control of a par-

54 Id.

tion, they usually involve harm done by those who have a duty to protect the

56 Id. at 795-796.

ent. Usually the child is too young or too intimidated to testify as to what hap-

57 Id.

pened and is easily manipulated on cross-examination. That [a] child . . . [does]

58 Rose Marie Penzerro, Families Experiencing Domestic Violence and Child Abuse, present-

not survive, strengthens, rather than diminishes, the law’s concern for the prob-

ed at the Prevent Child Abuse Conference, Feb. 20-21, 2006 (Dallas, Texas 2006).

lems of prosecuting a defendant in a “battered child” case. As background, direct

59 “PLEASE KEEP ME SAFE” (Promise House 2006) (pamphlet presented at a presentation

testimony of earlier episodes of harm done to the child is admissible. Crucial to

at the Prevent Child Abuse Conference, Feb. 20-21, 2006 (Dallas, Texas)).

identifying such cases are the discrepancies between the parent’s version of what

60 State v. Stuart, 715 P.2d 833, 846 (Idaho 1986); see also State v. Furlough, 797 S.W.2d

happened to the child when the injuries occurred and the testimony of medical

631, 651 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (husband who verbally and physically assaulted his wife also
sexually molested his daughter).

experts as to what could not have happened, or must have happened, to produce
the injuries.

61 Stuart, 715 P.2d at 846.

Schleret v. State, 311 N.W.2d 843, 844-845 (Minn. 1981).

63 Id. (citing David Johnson, Women Testify that Stuart Beat, Choked Them, LEWISTON

ting into evidence the physician's diagnosis that his thirteen month old son was a victim of

he “bound her to the bed and beat her stomach with his fists and forced the handle of a spatula

of 'battered child syndrome' has become an accepted medical diagnosis” and that “it has been

62 Id.

MORNING TRIB., Oct. 9, 1982, at 1A). When Stuart learned that his first wife was pregnant,
up her vagina in an attempt to abort her pregnancy.” Stuart, 715 P.2d at 876. Another particularly egregious incident occurred when she was recovering in the hospital from “a month-long
coma.” Id. (noting that the former wife had been “run over and left on the road by an

unknown driver while she was attempting to . . . hide from [Stuart] since he was just released
from incarceration” due to her report to the police of Stuart’s abuse of her as well as burglary

and auto thefts). Although Stuart was barred from the hospital because of his previous abuse,

he entered “late at night” and “removed [his former wife’s] frail 86-pound body from her hospital bed, along with catheter, IV’s, and drainage bags, to the bathroom where he raped her.”

Id. Another woman, who lived with Stuart for three months, told of one incident when “Stuart
cut clothing off of her with a butcher knife. Id. “On another occasion…he tried to drown her

in a lake [and] held her until her lungs began to fill with water, then he released her.” Id. (cit-

76 See People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App.3d 504, 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that admit-

BCS was not an “improper invasion of the province of the jury” and noting that “the diagnosis
recognized as a legally qualified diagnosis on the trial court level for some time”); see also

Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389, 399 (Cal. 1976) (concluding that “the diagnosis of the 'bat-

tered child syndrome' has become an accepted medical diagnosis” but ruling that the trial court
erred in sustaining the demurrer of defendant doctor and hospital as to whether defendants had
a duty to recognize BCS, in a case involving an eleven-month-old infant who suffered a comminuted spiral fracture of her leg, a skull fracture, burns and multiple bruises over her entire
back caused by her mother and her mother’s live-in boyfriend).

77 Children under the age of four still have the greatest risk of being severely injured or

killed as a result of domestic abuse. In 2003, 79% of the fatalities from domestic abuse syn-

drome involved children under four, with infants under one accounting for 44% of the deaths.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., supra note 4.

ing Johnson, supra, at 1A). Stuart’s second wife, Vicki Nelson, said that Stuart started beating

78 Jackson, 95 Cal. Rpt. at 921.

occurrence. Stuart, 715 P.2d at 846 (quoting Vicki Nelson). She described one incident when

80 See id. (quoting expert testimony from the child’s pediatrician).

at 876. Stuart “covered her face with a pillow” and hit her in the abdomen. Id. When she

admission of expert testimony regarding BCS in affirming a mother’s conviction of cruelty to a

her about three weeks after they were married and that the abuse became an “every-other day”
she was pregnant and Stuart knocked her out. She awoke to find that she was tied in bed. Id.
passed out, he would remove the pillow, “revive her with a wet washcloth and repeat the

abuse.” Id. On other occasions, Stuart “poked her in the chest with his finger, choked her,

knocked her to the floor and struck her in the face with his fists [for] smoking, watching television or taking showers without him”. Id. In addition, Stuart once beat her because she had

received a set of luggage for Christmas from her parents and once locked her two-year-old
daughter in the bathroom for nine hours. Id.

64 Id. at 846.

65
56

SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 28, 2007, at A2.

See generally ROBERT H. BREMNER, CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA, A

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 123 n.63 (1970) (discussing two cases that were tried in 1675
and 1678 which resulted in the courts removing the abused children from parental homes).

67 Id.; see also Micheal D. Rosenbaum, To Break the Shell Without Scrambling the Egg: An
Empirical Analysis of the Impact Of Intervention Into Violent Families, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 409, 411 (1998).

68 Barbara R. Grumet, The Plaintive Plaintiffs: The Victims of the Battered Child Syndrome,

4 FAM. L.Q. 296 (1970).

69 ROBERT W. TEN BENSEL ET AL., CHILDREN IN A WORLD OF VIOLENCE: THE

ROOTS OF CHILD MALTREATMENT IN THE BATTERED CHILD 3 (Mary Edna Helfer et
al. eds., 5th ed. 1997) (quoting JACOB RIIS, CHILDREN OF THE POOR (1894)).
70 Rosenbaum, supra note 70, at 411.
71 Id.

72 Id.; see also, R. H. Brown et al., Medical and Legal Aspects of the Battered Child

Syndrome, 50 CHI-KENT L. REV. 45, 45-46 (1973).

73 C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. J. 17, 17-

18 (1962). Dr. Kempe also surveyed seventy-seven District Attorneys who handled 447 reports
of beaten children in one year, with 46% resulting in court action. Id. Unfortunately, fortyfive of the children died of their injuries while 290 suffered permanent brain damage. Id.

74 Id.

75 The crucial necessity of allowing expert testimony regarding BCS in prosecuting the abuser
was explained by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Schleret v. State, where a stepfather beat his
three-year-old stepson to death, as follows:

Much of the evidence that can be gathered to show an instance of “battered child
syndrome” is circumstantial. In allowing such evidence to support a conviction,
this court has recognized that those felonious assaults are in a unique category.

Most cases of felonious assault tend to occur in a single episode to which there are
sometimes witnesses. By contrast, cases that involve “battered child syndrome”
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79 Id.

81 See, e.g., United States v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527, 528-529 (5th Cir. 1981) (upholding the
child in the death of her two-and-a-half -year-old daughter); United States v. Boise, 916 F.2d

497, 504, fn. 16 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the argument of a father, who had been convicted of
second degree murder in the death of his six month old son, that even the term “battered child
syndrome” should not have been permitted since it was unfairly prejudicial).

82 See, e.g., Eslava v. State, 473 So. 2d 1143, 1147 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (holding that

expert testimony was admissible to show that an infant fit the profile for BCS and received

lethal non-accidental injuries, including a skull fracture, which were inflicted by his mother's
live-in boyfriend when he “intentionally, maliciously and willfully stomped the infant to

death”); State v. Moyer, 727 P. 2d 31, 33 (Ariz. Ct. App.1986) (noting, in a case involving

burns and a fractured skull inflicted by a stepfather on his twenty-one-month-old stepdaughter,

that BCS has become an “accepted medical diagnosis” indicating that a “child of tender years”

has not suffered certain types of injuries by accidental means, which when “coupled with additional proof that the injuries occurred while the child was entrusted to the defendant is sufficient for a verdict of guilty”); People v. Ellis, 589 P.2d 494, 495-496 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978)

(upholding the admissibility of expert testimony of BCS in a case involving a four-year-old
who, after sustaining several prior fractures, was beaten to death by his stepmother, finding

that, “where . . . defendant's theory of the case is that death was accidental, and where there is
evidence of exclusive parental custody during the relevant period, evidence of past abuse is
admissible to prove intent, and to disprove accident”); State v. Dumlao, 491 A.2d 404, 410

(Conn. App. Ct 1985) (admitting expert testimony regarding BCS, where parents lethally bat-

tered their two year old daughter, and commenting that evidence of BCS, “coupled with other

proof, such as a continuing opportunity to inflict the injuries may permit an inference not only
that the injuries were not accidental but also that they were inflicted by one who regularly

cares for the child”); State v. Screpesi, 611 A.2d 34, 39 (Del. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that

evidence of BCS was properly admitted and noting that BCS is an “accepted medical diagnosis” that a young child, like the seven week old infant in the case, "has suffered a certain type
of injury intentionally rather than accidentally"); Albritton v. State, 221 So.2d 192, 194 (Fla.

Dist. App. Ct. 1969) (upholding the trial court’s decision to admit evidence regarding BCS and
the “gruesome and shocking” photographs of a sixteen-month-old toddler, who was beaten to

death by her mother’s boyfriend ); State v. Stuart, 715 P.2d 833, 870 (Idaho 1986) (stating that

BCS was “judicially recognized in the State of Idaho”); People v. Platter, 421 N.E.2d 181, 184
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (upholding a pediatrician's testimony that three year old Kristie Hubbard
was a victim of BCS and affirming her mother's boyfriend’s conviction of manslaughter in

Kristie's death from a massive bowel perforation); Bell v. Commonwealth, 684 S.W.2d 282,

283 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (finding no prejudicial error in admitting physicians’ opinions that an
infant, who suffered a lethal subdural hematoma from his father’s beating, was a victim of
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BCS and upholding the father’s conviction of second degree manslaughter); State v. Nash, 446

respectively); Righi v. State, 689 S.W.2d 908, 909 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (allowing medical tes-

abdominal and head injuries and rib fractures suffered by a nineteen-month-old child inflicted

her mother for “intentionally and knowingly engaging in conduct causing [her daughter] seri-

So.2d 810, 812, 814 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (admitting testimony from a coroner that the fatal

by his mother’s live-in boyfriend were indicative of BCS and noting that the boyfriend “had

the only opportunity to harm the child, and his explanations of the manner in which the child
was injured were shown to be false”); State v. Conlogue, 474 A.2d 167, 172-173 (Me. 1984)

(noting the acceptance of BCS as a diagnosis in Maine and holding that, by excluding medical

testimony of BCS, the trial court improperly denied defendant the opportunity to have the jury
consider the credibility of the mother’s recantation of her confession to the abuse); Duley v.
State, 467 A.2d 776, 781 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (quoting pathologist Dr. Brian D.

Blackbourne (allowing evidence that two-month-old Michelle Duley, who died from her

father's abuse, was a victim of BCS based on her “unreasonable injuries” including fractures
and internal hemorrhaging from lethal shaking by her father)); Commonwealth v. Day, 569

N.E.2d 397, 400 (Mass. 1991) (noting that BCS “has come to be a well recognized medical
diagnosis”); People v. Barnard, 286 N.W.2d 870, 871 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that

expert evidence regarding BCS was admissible since it is a “widely recognized medical diag-

nosis which indicates that a child has been injured by other than accidental means” and affirming the mother’s boyfriend’s conviction of second degree murder in the death of her two-year-

old child); State v. Goblirsch, 246 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Minn. 1976) (upholding admission of expert
testimony regarding BCS, noting that “its use in this case was potentially no more prejudicial

that the revolting nature of the infant’s injuries themselves” and affirming the father’s convic-

timony that a child suffered from BCS and upholding the conviction and six year sentence of
ous physical deficiency & impairment”); State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 543-545 (Utah 1983)
(noting that “[o]ur research shows that all courts which have addressed the question have

affirmed the admission of expert medical testimony regarding the presence of the battered child
syndrome” and holding that expert testimony regarding BCS was admissible because it was

“not used broadly” but was “defined and applied” to the three-year-old victim of her mother's
lethal abuse “with particularity”); State v. Janes, 850 P.2d 495, 502 n.6 (Wash. 1993) (noting

that Washington courts admit evidence of BCS “for purposes of proving a physical pattern of
child abuse”); State v. Johnson, 400 N.W.2d 502, 504, 507 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding

expert testimony regarding BCS in prosecutions involving child victims since “those felonious
assaults are in a unique category” and affirming the manslaughter conviction of a man who

was “like a second father” to the child he beat to death) and Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721,

727 (Wyo. 1984) (recognizing the acceptance of the term BCS and upholding the child abuse
conviction and six month jail sentence of the mother of four-and-a-half-year-old battered
child).

83 Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 69 (1991).
84 Id.

85 Id.

86 See id. (noting that the “marked discrepancy between the clinical findings and historical

tion of first degree manslaughter in the death of his two-month-old daughter); Aldridge v.

data as supplied by the parents” also typifies BCS).

any child exhibiting evidence of possible trauma or neglect . . . or where there is a marked dis-

testimony from Dr. Frank Miller). Based on a survey of dependency cases, one legal expert

State, 398 So.2d 1308, 1309, 1312 (Miss. 1981) (opining that BCS “should be considered in
crepancy between the clinical findings and the historical data as supplied by the parents and

affirming the fifteen year sentence and convictions of both parents of felonious abuse and battery of their infant daughter); State v. Taylor, 515 P.2d 695, 703 (Mont. 1973) (finding that

87 In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 893 P.2d 60, 63 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting expert
described the following types of physical abuse parents inflict on their older children as follows:

evidence regarding BCS is fully admissible as expert testimony); Bludsworth v. State, 646 P.2d

belts, electrical cords, sticks, coat hangers, bats, and studded weapons. They are

558, 558-559 (Nev. 1982) (noting that BCS is “an accepted diagnosis signifying serious and

locked in rooms without food or heat and forced to carry excrement or to eat

persistent physical abuse” and affirming the conviction of two-year-old Eric Johnson’s stepfa-

urine-soaked food. They have plastic bags placed over their heads, are knocked

ther of child abuse and second degree murder, as well as the conviction of the child’s mother of
child abuse); People v. Henson, 304 N.E.2d 358, 363-364 (N.Y. 1973) (noting that evidence of

The reported cases tell us that in the name of discipline children are beaten with

into walls, are scalded, or immersed in freezing water….They are injured, they are
scarred, and they die.

BCS “coupled with additional proof . . . that the injuries occurred while the child was in the

Kandice K. Johnson, Crime or Punishment: The Parental Corporal Punishment Defense—

not accidental but that, in addition, they occurred at the culpable hands of its parents,” and

see also People v. Anderson, 406 P.2d 43, 48 (Cal. 1965) (mother’s live-in boyfriend lethally

sole custody of the parents would permit the jury to infer not only that the child’s injuries were
affirming the convictions of the parents of criminally negligent homicide in the death of their

four-year-old son); State v. Wilkerson, 247 S.E.2d 905, 912, 919 (N.C. 1978) (noting that “all

courts which have considered the question . . . have concluded that . . . expert medical testimony concerning the battered child syndrome . . . is properly admitted into evidence,” and affirm-

ing a father’s conviction of second degree murder in the beating death of his two-year-old son);
In re R.W.B., 241 N.W.2d 546, 550, 555 (N.D. 1976) (upholding admissibility of BCS in ter-

minating parents’ rights where their son suffered eleven separate bone fractures of his arms and
his legs during his first seven months of life); State v. Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d 1332, 1335 (Ohio

Reasonable and &ecessary, or Excused Abuse?, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 413, 481-482 (1988);

stabbed her ten year old daughter sixty times, including cutting her tongue and inflicting one
wound which extended from the child’s rectum through her vagina; Turner v. District of
Columbia, 532 A.2d at 664-665 (father starved his five month old son to death).

88 Maricopa County, 893 P.2d at 63 (quoting expert testimony from Dr. Frank Miller).

89 See DAVIS, supra note 5, at 23 (noting additionally that one in three girls will be sexually

violated during their lifetimes and that 95% of all child sexual abuse victims knew their
abusers).

90 Bethea, supra note 61.

1998) (noting that BCS, as “the label for a set of physical symptoms that provide proof of child

91 Vincent J. Felitti et al., Relationship of Childhood Abuse and Household Dysfunction to

ty”); Ashford v. State, 603 P. 2d 1162, 1164-1165 (Okla. 1979) (upholding expert testimony

(1998); Desmond K. Runyan et al., Child Abuse and &eglect By Parents and Caregivers, in

abuse,” has been used “for over 30 years in this context . . . by the medical and legal communifrom a pathologist regarding BCS being “a characteristic finding in children who have been

mistreated in some way by another person,” and upholding a mother’s boyfriend’s conviction

of first degree manslaughter and forty year sentence in the beating death of her eight month old
son); Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 528 A.2d 610, 615-616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (upholding testimony regarding BCS and affirming parents’ convictions for involuntary manslaughter, and

sentences of up to five years, in the death from malnutrition of their two-and-a-half-year-old

daughter); State v. Durand, 465 A.2d 762, 763, 768 (R.I. 1983) (affirming a mother's convic-

tion of manslaughter and sentence of fifteen years for the death of her four-month-old son from
a subdural hematoma, and ruling that the jury could infer from expert testimony regarding

“child abuse syndrome” that the infant’s injuries were inflicted by his mother); State v. Lopez,
412 S.E.2d 390, 392 (S.C. 1991) (upholding the admissibility of expert testimony regarding

BCS in a stepmother's conviction for murdering her three-year-old stepson and indicating that
“such testimony may support an inference that the child's injuries were not sustained by acci-

dental means”); State v. Best, 232 N.W.2d 447, 458 (S.D. 1975) (affirming a mother’s conviction for second degree manslaughter in the beating death of her fourteen-month-old son and

noting that the court had not found any case where expert medical testimony regarding BCS

was rejected); Hawkins v. State, 555 S.W.2d 876, 876-878 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977) (upholding

expert testimony regarding BCS as well as photographs showing the healthy condition of two-

and-a-half-year-old Laura before her death and the “pitiful condition of [her] maltreated body”
shortly after her death due to prolonged beatings, causing a “gradual deterioration of [Laura’s]
health . . . over a lengthy period during which she literally bled to death from internal injuries

that weakened her system,” and affirming the convictions of her mother and her mother’s livein boyfriend of second degree murder with sentences of seventy-seven years and 199 years
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Many of the Leading Causes of Death in Adults, 14 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 245-258

WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND HEALTH 59-86 (Etienne Krug et al. eds., World
Health Org. 2002).

92 P.L. Owens, Domestic Violence: Impact On Psychiatric Medicine, 1995 J.S. C. MED.

ASSOC. 435-438 (1995); J.V. Becker et al., Empirical Research on Child Abuse Treatment:
Report by the Child Abuse and &eglect Treatment Working Group, American Psychological
Association, J. CLIN. CHILD PSYCHOL. 23-46 (1995).

93 See HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 1220 (C. Eugene Walker &
Michael C. Roberts eds., John Wiley & Sons 1983) (cited in State v. Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d
1332, 1339 (Ohio 1998) (noting that trauma can also be caused by “verbal overload with

insults, accusations, and indoctrination”)); see also People. v. Wade, 750 P.2d 794, 800, (Cal.

1988) (noting that the mother’s live-in boyfriend, in addition to killing the mother’s ten-year-

old daughter and beating her other four young children, punished the children by making them

take cold showers, stand on one foot for extended periods, and drink their own urine as well as
a mixture of salt and milk, to induce vomiting); see also Nebgen v. State, 192 N.E.130, 131

(Ohio Ct. App. 1933) (where a deceased mother’s former live-in boyfriend was convicted of

willful torture in chaining her seven-year-old son naked to a bathtub with a dog collar during
the day while the boyfriend was at work).

94 Brodie v. Summit Co. Child. Serv. Bd., 554 N.E.2d 1301, 1303 (Ohio 1990).
95 M.A. v. J.A., 781 S.W.2d 94, 95 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).

96 GABARINO, GUTTMANN, & SEELEY, THE PSYCHOLOGICALLY BATTERED
CHILD, 69 tbl.2 (1986) (“Components Involved in Identification of Psychological
Maltreatment”).
97

Id.
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Id.

CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND, supra note 2; see also, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUS-

TICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE (2000) (estimating that, between 1993 and 1998, 43% of

households where domestic violence occurred included children under twelve years of age);

see also DAVID GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN: PHYSICAL CHILD ABUSE IN
THE UNITED STATES 122 (1970) (discussing an earlier study revealing that almost two-

thirds of the other children residing in the home were present at the time the abuse of their sibling occurred). Moreover, in one study of 100 battered women, over half (54%) reported that

their abuser had also either hurt or killed family pets and sixty-two of the women indicated that
their children were present when the pet was abused. Frank R. Ascione, Animal Abuse and
Youth Violence, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN (September 2001).
100 In re Edward C., 178 Cal. Rptr. 694, 704 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).

101 See id. (noting that it is “reasonable to infer that continued exposure to the threat of physical force will inhibit the healthy emotional development necessary to a progression from
childhood to independent manhood”).

102 CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND, supra note 2; see also H. Lien Bragg, Child Protection

in Families Experiencing Domestic Violence, U.S. Dept. HHS/ACYF/Office of Child Abuse
and Neglect: Washington, D.C. (2003); R.J. Magan, K., Conroy & A. Del Tufo, Domestic

logical symptoms of a child [who’s] been battered. . . . [b]ut, over the years it has come to
include the psychological symptoms that come from being a battered child’”)).

129 Maryland v. Smullen, 844 A.2d 429, 445 (Md. 2004). In fact, some experts have tried to

distinguish the two battered child syndromes by referring to the psychological effects of battering as the “child abuse syndrome” or by discussing it as a form of post traumatic stress disorder or acute stress disorder. State v. Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d 1332, 1335 (Ohio 1998) (citing

DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 424-431 (4 Ed.
1994) (“DSM-IV”)).

130 Smullen, 844 A.2d at 447 (quoting Steven R. Hicks, Admissibility Of Expert Testimony

On The Psychology Of The Battered Child, 11 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 111 (Spring 1987) (cit-

ing R. Helfer & C. Kempe, HELPING THE BATTERED CHILD AND HIS FAMILY (1972))).

131 See Gallegos, 719 P.2d at 1271 (declaring “[i]ncidents of domestic violence tend to follow
predictable patterns”)

132 WALKER, supra note 43; see also Emrick, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 558 (quoting expert testimony from Dr. Matilda Rice and describing BWS in a case where a woman shot her physically

abusive live-in boyfriend while he was sleeping, as a “multi-stage form of familial ‘disease’”
with stage one consisting of “verbal abuse and possibly minor physical abuse”, stage two

involving “an escalation of physical abuse in degree and quantity” and stage three where the
abuse “`gets totally out of control’”); Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 10 (quoting expert witness Dr.

Violence in Child Welfare Preventative Services: Results from An Intake Screening

Lenore Walker (explaining the three phases of “The Cycle Theory” as consisting of the “’ten-

CHILDREN’S PERSPECTIVES ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, LONDON (Sage 2002).

Witt, 892 P.2d at 136 (describing the “cycle of violence” as consisting of “three stages: a ten-

Questionnaire, 22 CHILD & YOUTH SERV’S REV. 251-274 (2000); Audrey Mullender et al.,
103 Penzerro, supra note 58.

104 Id. One study estimated that forty-five percent of A.D.H.D. children had been exposed to

domestic violence. See “PLEASE KEEP ME SAFE,” supra note 59.

105 JENNY GOMEZ, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND

ADDICTION (The Betty Ford Center 2006), presented at the Prevent Child Abuse Conference,
Dallas, Texas (2006).
106 Id.

107 R. LaFave & W. Scott Austin, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7 (2d ed. 1986).

108 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §197 (West 2007) (noting that “[h]omicide is. . . justifi-

sion-building’ period”, the “‘acute-explosion’ period” and the “‘loving, contrition’ period”));

sion building stage in which the battered woman attempts to appease the batterer and prevent
the abuse, the violent stage in which the abuse actually occurs, and the honeymoon stage in

which the batterer apologizes and pleads for forgiveness, giving the battered woman hope the
abuse will end”).

133 Janes, 850 P.2d at 502.

134 State v. MacLennan, 702 N.W.2d 219, 227 (Minn. 2005) (citing expert testimony by

Clinical Psychiatrist Dr. Michael Arambula, who asserted that “the attack will usually involve
excessive force because the child is unable to control his or her emotions”).

135 Smullen, 844 A.2d at 441 (citing Hope Toffel, Note, Crazy Women, Unharmed Men, and

able when committed by any person. . . [w]hen resisting any attempt to murder any person, or

Evil Children: Confronting the Myths About Battered People Who Kill Their Abusers, And The

109 People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis in original).

Violence, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 337, 349 (1999) (citing WALKER, supra note 43, at 95)).

to commit a felony, or do so some great bodily injury upon any person”).
110

Id.

111

Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 179 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 195 (West 2007) and PAUL H.

112

Smith, supra note 19, at 156.

Argument For Extending Battering Syndrome Self-Defenses to All Victims Of Domestic
136 Id.

137 Id.

ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 173, at 280 et seq. (1984)).

138 See State v. Richardson, 525 N.W.2d 378, 380 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting expert testi-

113 DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 236.

woman’s conviction of second degree reckless homicide and remanding for a new trial).

114 Id.

115 Bechtel v. State, 840 P. 2d 1, 7 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992); see also Hawthorne v. State, 408
So.2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 412 So.2d 1361 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that

expert testimony regarding BWS was not offered to show “that the mental and physical mis-

treatment of [the abused wife by her husband] affected her mental state so that she could not be
responsible for her actions; rather, the testimony would be offered to show that because she

suffered from the syndrome, it was reasonable for her to have remained in the home and, at the

mony from a psychologist who specialized in treating battered women, reversing the battered
139 Smullen, 844 A.2d at 441 (quoting WALKER, supra note 43, at 96).
140 Richardson, 525 N.W.2d at 380.

141 See Mary Ann Dutton, Validity Of ‘Battered Woman’s Syndrome’ in Criminal Cases

Involving Battered Women, U.S. Dept. of Justice 1, 6-7 (1996) (asserting that battered women

often remain in an abusive relationship because episodes of abuse may recur infrequently, over
long periods of time).

142 See Richardson, 525 N.W.2d at 380 (quoting expert testimony that described the cycle of

pertinent time, to have believed that her life and the lives of her children were in imminent

violence as “a three-stage circular process – a tension-building phase erupting into violence

116 Smith, supra note 19, at 156.

batterer”).

danger”).

117 CAL. PENAL CODE § 208 (West 2007).

118 State v. Lynch, 436 So.2d 567, 568-569 (La. 1983).
119 Id.

120 State v Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268, 1271-1272 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); accord State v.

Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 814 (N.D. 1983) (reversing a murder conviction of an abused wife
who killed her husband with a butcher knife as he slept after an evening of drinking and violence on the part of both parties).

121 Gallegos, 719 P.2d at 1271-1272.

122 Id.

123 WALKER, supra note 43.

124 Id.; see also infra notes 136-145 and accompanying text.

125 WALKER, supra note 43; infra at notes 152-168 and accompanying text; see also

followed by a honeymoon stage where the batterer often apologizes and the victim forgives the
143 WALKER, supra, note 43.

144 State v. Janes, 822 P.2d 1238, 1244, n.10 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).

145 Janes, 850 P.2d at 502 (quoting Mones, supra note 3, at 63); see also Bautista, 2006 WL
3826667, at *9 (noting that “[c]hildren who live in an abusive home are watchful and vigilant
about impending abuse or danger. They walk on egg shells, so to speak, just like battered
women”).

146 Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 16, (quoting Gallegos, 719 P.2d at 1271).

147 Id. (quoting Banks v. State, 608 A.2d 1249, 1252 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).

148 See, e.g., Lenore Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome is a Psychological Consequence

of Abuse, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 133, 139 (Richard J.
Gelles & D.R. Loseke eds. 1993) [hereinafter Walker, Psychological Consequence].

149 People v. Sherman, 2002 WL 1506574, at *3 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 2005). See also, Jahnke

Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 783-786 (Pa. 1989) (holding that expert testimo-

v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1017 (Wyo. 1984) (sixteen year old Richard Jahnke, who had been beat-

where the defendant has been shown to be a victim of psychological and physical abuse”).

lence”).

ny regarding BWS “is admissible as a basis for proving justification in the use of deadly force
126 See infra notes 132-150, 162-169 and accompanying text (noting that domestic violence
follows particular patterns, including hypervigilance).
127 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.

128 See People v. Bautista, 2006 WL 3826667, *9 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 2006) (quoting expert

witness Dr. Nancy Kaser-Boyd (stating that BCS initially described “`the physical and psycho-
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en by his father for fourteen years, recognized his father’s “‘stomping’ as a preface to vio150 John Scobey, Self-Defense Parricide: Expert Psychiatric Testimony on The Battered
Child Syndrome, 13 HAM. J. PUB. L. & POL. 181 (1992).
151 Janes, 850 P.2d at 502.

152 Lenore E. A. Walker, Battered Women Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME

J.L.ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 321, 330 (1992) [hereinafter Walker, Battered Women
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Syndrome].

153 WALKER, supra note 43, at 49-50; see also, Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678, 680 (Ga.

188 Id. at 499 (noting that Walter, the mother’s boyfriend once choked Andrew’s brother).

189 Janes, 822 P.2d at 1243.

1981) (noting that a battered woman’s “self-respect is usually very low and she believes she is

190 Janes, 850 P.2d at 502. In &emeth, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that it had previously

reaches a state of ‘learned helplessness’; her efforts to improve the relationship or extract her-

failure to retreat from an allegedly abusive environment are not inconsistent with a claim of

a worthless person”); Witt, 892 P.2d at 136 (describing how a “battered woman eventually

self from the situation prove futile, she learns she cannot escape the relationship because of her
financial status or fear of retribution, and she abandons her efforts”); EDWARD GONDOLF &

ELLEN FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 11, 12 (1988) (describing a battered woman as being

“immobilized amidst the uncertainty of when abuse will occur” and feeling “that she has no

control over her experience” so that “no matter what she does, she ‘gets it’. . . . The cage door
is shut, so to speak, and the women have no apparent way out.”).
154 Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 10 (quoting Dr. Lenore Walker).

155 Smullen, 844 A.2d at 450 (quoting Erin Masson, Admissibility of Expert or Opinion

Evidence of Battered-Woman Syndrome on Issue of Self-Defense, 58 ALR 5TH 749, 762-763
(1998)).

156 Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 3.

157 Richardson, 525 N.W.2d at 380.

158 Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 3 (quoting expert testimony from Dr. Lee Bowker (noting that bat-

tered women are “often inaccurately portrayed as ‘cardboard figures, paper-thin punching bags

accepted expert testimony regarding BWS to “explain that the non-reporting of abuse and the

severe abuse.” Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d at 1337. The &emeth court concluded that “[s]urely,” if it
accepted “nonreporting and failure to retreat by adults, the reasons for such conduct are even
more understandable when a child is the subject of abuse.” Id. at 1336-1337.

191 SAGATUN-EDWARDS & EDWARDS, supra note 166, at 246.
192 Maricopa County, 893 P.2d at 62.
193 Id.

194 Id. at 63 (quoting expert witness Dr. Frank Miller).

195 Id.

196 Id.

197 Id.

198 Id.

199 Id. Although K.T. was initially charged with first degree murder, the appellate court

affirmed a finding by the juvenile court that she was guilty of the lesser-included offense of

manslaughter because, as a victim of BCS, K.T. was in “a constant heat of passion [and] fear,

believing that shooting her mother was her only option to protect herself and her sister.” Id. at

who merely absorb the violence but didn’t do anything about it’” whereas, in fact, they attempt

65-66 (Voss, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

er-violence, seeking the help of friends and family, going to a shelter, and contacting police”)).

(The Vincentian Center for Church and Society 2000), available at

a variety of different strategies to alleviate their plight, including “hiding, running away, count159 Richardson, 525 N.W.2d at 380; see also MacLennan, 702 N.W.2d at 234 (noting that

courts allow expert testimony regarding BWS “to dispel the common misconception that a nor-

mal or reasonable person would not remain in such an abusive relationship”); State v. Leaphart,
673 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983) (describing how a spouse caught up in a cycle

of domestic violence “may become helpless and be psychologically prevented from leaving the

200 Philip M. Drucker, The Consequences of Poverty and Child Maltreatment on IQ Scores
http://www.vincenter.org/97/drucker.html.

201 Jennifer Macomber, An Overview of Selected Data on Children in Vulnerable Families 1
(Urban Institute & Child Trends 2006); see also Richard J. Gelles, Poverty And Violence

Toward Children, 35 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 258-274 (1992) [hereinafter Gelles, Poverty

and Violence]; P.K. Trickett, L.J. Aber, V. Cicchetti & D. Cicchetti, Relationship of

relationship”).

Socioeconomic Status to the Etiology and Developmental Sequelae of Physical Child Abuse, 27

161 Id. at 315.

family poverty . . . has long been recognized as a core condition in child maltreatment”).

160 State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 313, 316 (Wash. 1984).
162 Hundley, 693 P.2d at 478-479.
163 Janes, 850 P.2d at 502.
164 Id. at 500.

165 Janes, 822 P.2d at 1243 (citation omitted); see also Bautista, 2006 WL 3826667, at *9

(noting that the “primary effect of BCS is fear”).

DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 279-285 (1990) (noting that the “devastating problem of
202 American Humane Association, America’s Children: How Are They Doing? 1 (Am.
Humane Ass’n 2007).

203 CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND, supra note 2.
204 CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND, supra note 2.

205 Id. (noting that child poverty has increased by over 1.4 million since 2000).

166 INGER J. SAGATUN-EDWARDS & LEONARD P. EDWARDS, CHILD ABUSE AND

Unfortunately, more than 840,000 of these children live in “extreme poverty,” a term describ-

noted that “[t]he times that abused women and children fear their abusers are not limited to

lies had to get by on less than $7,412.00 per year or $20.00 per day. Id.

THE LEGAL SYSTEM 247 (Wadsworth Group 1995). Co-author, Judge Leonard P. Edwards,
immediately before and during beatings. Their fear of death or great bodily harm may persist
throughout most of their daily life.” Id.

167 Janes, 850 P.2d at 503.

168 Sacks, supra note 19, at 355-356.

ing families living at less than one-half of the poverty level, meaning that in 2004 these fami206 Gelles, Poverty and Violence, supra note 201, at 263.

207 CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND, supra note 2.

208 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 16.

209 Id. (noting that 20 out of every 1,000 lower income women were abused while only 3 out

169 See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 43, at 27-28; Herbert Silver, Coping With An Abusive

of 1,000 upper income women suffered domestic abuse).

170 Witt, 892 P.2d at 137.

3 (Minn. Center Against Violence & Abuse 1998), available at

Relationship: I. How and Why Do Women Stay?, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 311 (1991).
171 Zorza, supra note 1, at 390.

172 GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 153, at 11.

173 Dutton, supra note 141, at 4; see also Smith, 277 S.E.2d at 680 (noting that a battered

woman may fail to report abuse to “her family or friends out of fear that they might take action
into their own hands and be injured and she would rather be hurt than endanger somebody
else”).

174 Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 971.

175 Zorza, supra note 1, at 390.
176 Id.

177 Dutton, supra note 141, at 5.

178 Id. at 6.

179 Janes, 850 P.2d at 502 (quoting Mones, supra note 3, at 33).

180 See, e.g., Lawrence Mayer, Kids Who Kill Their Parents, WASH. POST, MAY 13, 1984,

at 15-16 (describing how a “tight bond, like that between master and slave, develops”).

210 Eleanor Lyon, Poverty, Welfare and Battered Women: What Does The Research Tell Us?
http://www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/welfare/welfare.pdf. For example, a Massachusetts
study of 734 women receiving welfare found that almost two-thirds had suffered physical

abuse from a male partner during their lives and almost 20% reported such abuse during the
past year. M.A. Allard, R. Albelda, M.E. Colten and C. Cozena, In Harm’s Way? Domestic

Violence, AFDC Receipt and Welfare Reform in Massachusetts (McCormack Institute 1997).
Another study of 846 women receiving welfare in New Jersey found that almost 60% had

experienced domestic violence in their lifetimes and 20% of those who were then in a relationship with a man reported being physically abused. C. Curcio, The Passaic County Study of

AFDC Recipients In A Welfare-To-Work Program (Passaic County Board of Social Services

1997). Finally, a study of 290 Chicago welfare recipients revealed that almost 49% had suffered “severe aggression” (defined as “kicking, hitting, biting, beating, injuring, raping, and

threatening with or using a weapon”) from their male partner and that almost 20% of those currently in a relationship had experienced “severe aggression” within the preceding year. S.
Lloyd, The Effects Of Domestic Violence On Women’s Employment (Institute for Policy

181 Janes, 850 P.2d at 502-503; see also State v. Grewe, 813 P.2d 1238, 1248 (Wash. 1991)

Research 1996).

children are among the most vulnerable members of society due to their trusting nature”).

child abuse or neglect occur in families receiving welfare”).

(noting that one aspect of children’s extreme vulnerability is their tendency to trust and that
182 Heide, supra note 19, at 2.
183 Id.

184 Id.

185 Janes, 850 P.2d at 499-500.
186 Id. at 499.

187 Id. at 499-500.
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211 Macomber, supra note 201 (noting that close to one-half of “all identified incidents of
212 Barbara Price, Domestic Violence Traps Women and Children in Poverty (New Jersey
Coalition for Battered Women 2000) (citing a 1998 study conducted by Homes for the
Homeless).

213 Macomber, supra note 201, at 1.

214 Joan I. Vondra, Socioeconomic Considerations: The Family Economy, in TROUBLED

YOUTH, TROUBLED FAMILIES (J. Garbarino & Assoc., N.Y. eds, Aldine Publishing Co.
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1986).

defendant and physical and sexual abuse of his sister and mother was not relevant in determin-

216 Id.

he shot his abusive father as he was getting out of the family car); see also Robert Hegadorn,

215 Macomber, supra note 201, at 1.
217 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (DHHS), ADMINISTRATION

ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES (ACF), EMERGING PRACTICES IN THE PREVENTION OF CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT (Washington D.C. Government Printing Office
2003).

218 Jody Raphael, Taylor Institute & Richard M. Tolman, Trapped By Poverty/Trapped By

Abuse: &ew Evidence Documenting The Relationship Between Domestic Violence And Welfare
(University of Michigan 1997), available at

http://humanservices.ucdavis.edu/resource/uploadfiles/x%20Trapped%20by%20Poverty,%20Tr
apped%20by%20Abuse.pdf.

219 Sharon Vandivere, Megan Gallagher & Kristen Anderson Moore, Changes in Children’s

Well-Being and Family Environments, 18 SNAPSHOTS OF AMERICA’S FAMILIES III
(Urban Institute 2004).
220 Id.

221 Macomber, supra note 201, at 1.

ing the reasonableness of the seventeen year old boy’s belief in his need for self-defense when
Clemency: Doing Justice To Incarcerated Battered Children, 55 J. MO. BAR 70, 71 (1999)

(explaining that “[b]attered child syndrome has long been used to prosecute child abusers, but
unlike the related phenomenon of battered woman syndrome, its acceptance as evidence

demonstrating that a homicide defendant acted in self-defense is severely limited”); Reginald

M. Parker, When &o One Hears Their Cries: Battered Child Syndrome as a Defense: State v.
Janes, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 431, 435 (1994) (commenting that “courts have been
unwilling to embrace the battered child syndrome as a defense”).

238 See Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony On Battering And Its Effects In

Criminal Cases (Highlights), in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE VALIDITY

AND USE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMI-

NAL TRIALS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ix, ix (noting that such testimony is “most
readily accepted” in cases involving traditional self-defense); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF

JUSTICE, supra, at 5-6 (U.S. Dep’t of Just. 1996). The report was based on a study of state
and federal court decisions, as well as state legislation. See, e.g., Ex parte Cynthia Hill, 507

222 Child Trends Data Bank 2005, Parental Symptoms of Depression, CHILDREN WITH

So. 2d 558, 558 (Ala. 1987) (holding that “expert opinion testimony on battered wife syndrome

223 Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 3 (noting that women may remain in the relationship due to “lack

(admitting expert testimony regarding BWS based on CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 801 and 1107

224 Price, supra note 212.

woman who shot to death her abusive husband after he shot at her the night before his death);

LIMITATIONS, (Child Trends 2005).

of money”).

225 Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 3 (quoting expert testimony from Dr. Lee Bowker).

226 Dutton, supra note 141, at 5.

227 GONDOLF & FISHER, supra note 153.
228 Id.

229 B.E. Aguirre, Why Do They Return? Abused Wives in Shelters, 30 J. NAT’L ASS’N
SOC. WORKERS 350, 352 (1985).

230 Janes, 822 P.2d at 1243; see also &emeth, 694 N.E.2d at 1340 (noting that the “psychi-

atric and legal communities have clearly accepted that despite any minor differences in the

degree of power differentials between the batterer and the abused, the psychological effects of
family violence are legally indistinguishable whether suffered by children or adults” and that

“virtually every legal journal which discusses battered child syndrome as a defense to parricide
notes its similarity to battered woman syndrome”); Janes, 850 P.2d at 502 (commenting that

“[g]iven the close relationship between the battered woman and battered child syndromes, the

same reasons that justify admission of the former apply with equal force to the latter”); Jahnke,
682 P.2d at 996 (noting that, “conceptually there is no reason to distinguish a child who is a
victim of abuse” from “cases [that] deal with wives as victims of abuse”).

231 Janes, 850 P.2d at 502 (quoting Hicks, supra note 130, at 106); see also Bautista, 2006

WL 3826667, at *9 (quoting expert testimony from Dr. Nancy Kaser-Boyd (noting that “BCS

is not distinct from battered woman’s syndrome -- `the symptoms are the same’”)). The Janes
court referred to several cases for support which involved, not battered children, but battered
women. Janes, 850 P.2d at 501. The Washington Supreme Court explained: “While those

cases deal with wives as victims of abuse, conceptually there is no reason to distinguish a child
who is a victim of abuse.” Id. This perspective was echoed in the Washington Court of

Appeal’s decision in Janes: “[T]here is sufficient scientific basis to justify extending the bat-

tered woman syndrome to analogous situations affecting children…Neither law nor logic sug-

gests any reason to limit to women recognition of the impact a battering relationship may have

on the victim’s actions or perceptions.” Janes, 822 P.2d at 1243; see also Smullen, 844 A.2d at

439-440 (rejecting the lower court’s finding that “trying to fit Battered Spouse Syndrome and

Battered Child Syndrome into the framework of traditional self-defense analysis . . . is akin to
trying to fit the proverbial square peg into a round hole” and noting that the syndromes “have
become recognized, by some courts and in some of the literature, as kindred doctrines”).
232

233

Smullen, 844 A.2d at 446.

Janes, 822 P.2d at 1243 (citing State v. Fisher, 739 P.2d 683 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1987) (not-

ing that children are among the most vulnerable members of society”)).
234

Janes, 822 P.2d at 1243. Indeed, according to Judge Leonard Edwards, “[m]any argue

that such a ‘battered person defense’ may be equally if not more appropriate for abused children.” SAGATUN-EDWARDS & EDWARDS, supra note 166, at 247.
235 Sacks, supra note 19, at 351.
236 Janes, 822 P.2d at 1243.

237 See, e.g., State v. Crabtree, 805 P.2d 1, 2, 6 (Kan. 1991) (declining to “adopt a ‘battered

child’ syndrome defense that would use the same language and justification used in adopting
the battered wife syndrome defense”, noting that the abused child, Tommy Crabtree, had not
been abused during the seven years preceding the shotgun slaying of his abusive stepfather
although the stepfather continued to physically abuse Tommy’s mother and sexually abuse
Tommy’s sister); Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 991 (holding that evidence of past physical abuse of
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may be admitted when proper predicate and foundation are laid”); Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 16

and reversing the conviction for voluntary manslaughter, with an eight year sentence, of a
People v. Hare, 782 P.2d 831, 833-834 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (Dubofsky, J., dissenting)

(affirming the manslaughter conviction of Amber Hare in the shooting death of her boyfriend,
after he repeatedly threatened her “by placing a gun between her eyes and pulling the trigger”

and noting that it was “a battered woman syndrome case” since she had been “repeatedly beaten, threatened and humiliated and intimidated” by him during the six months they had been

together); Hawthorne, 470 So.2d at 773 (reversing the conviction of a battered wife who shot

her husband to death and concluding that expert testimony regarding BWS would be admissible); Smith, 277 S.E.2d at 683 (overturning a woman’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter
for shooting her live-in boyfriend following four years of physical abuse and finding that the
trial court erred in not admitting expert testimony regarding BWS); People v. Minnis, 455

N.E.2d 209, 211, 214-215, 218 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (reversing a woman’s conviction of murder
and 25 year sentence in the death of her husband and holding that the court erred in excluding
evidence of BWS which would have indicated that the wife’s decision to dismember her hus-

band’s body and put the parts in garbage bags, which she deposited in various dumpsters, was

influenced by her emotional reaction to the shock of her situation, including the abuse she suffered at the hands of her husband, which involved choking her and pushing “her head into the
toilet and repeatedly threaten[ing] her with death”); State v. Nunn, 356 N.W.2d 601, 603-604
(Iowa App. Ct. 1984) (allowing expert testimony regarding BWS); State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d
572, 582 (Kan. 1988) (allowing expert testimony regarding BWS and noting that “[m]ost

courts which have addressed the issue are in accord”); Commonwealth v. Rose, 725 S.W.2d

588, 589, 591 (Ky. 1987) (in a case where a woman shot her husband of seven years, who had
beaten and abused her on several occasions, the court noted “as a general proposition that evidence of BWS would be admissible after a proper foundation has been provided by evidence
that this is a mental condition constituting a recognized scientific entity . . .” but refused to

admit the testimony in this case since “the issue was not the admissibility of the subject matter,
but the limitations placed by the trial court on the witness’ testimony”); State v. Anaya, 438

A.2d 892, 892-894 (Me. 1981) (citing Ibn-Tamas v. U.S., 407 A.2d 626, 639 (D.C. App. 1979)

(overturning the manslaughter conviction of woman who killed her live-in boyfriend by knifing
him in the back because her life was “like a madhouse”, with the boyfriend pushing and kick-

ing her during the five months they lived together and holding that expert testimony regarding
BWS should have been admitted)); Rodriguez, 633 N.E.2d at 1042 (reversing a woman’s conviction of manslaughter for the stabbing death of her live-in boyfriend because the trial judge
had refused to admit evidence of BWS or the long history of physical abuse endured by the

defendant); Hennum, 441 N.W.2d at 798-799 (admitting expert testimony regarding BWS in a

case where a physically abused woman shot her sleeping husband); State v. Williams, 787

S.W.2d 308, 309, 312 (Mo. App. Ct. 1990) (reversing the second degree murder conviction of a
woman, who killed a man by running him over in her car while trying to kill her abusive

boyfriend, who beat her between ten and seventeen times, kicked her in the stomach while she
was pregnant and vandalized her apartment, and holding that expert testimony regarding BWS

is not dependent on the woman’s marital status and that her “mental state for killing her intended victim is transferred to the ultimate victim”); State v. Jackson, 435 N.W.2d 893, 894-895

(Neb. 1989) (affirming a woman’s conviction of second degree murder in the stabbing death of
her live-in boyfriend and upholding the defendant’s testimony that she was a victim of BWS
since her boyfriend physically and emotionally abused her); Kelly, 478 A.2d at 368-369

(reversing a battered woman’s murder conviction in the stabbing death of her husband with a
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pair of scissors after a “stormy” seven year marriage and finding that “the battered-woman’s

syndrome is an appropriate subject for expert testimony”); Gallegos, 719 P.2d at 1274 (hold-

ing that the trial court should have admitted expert testimony regarding BWS and noting that

person a present intention to kill him or do him great bodily harm”); Stewart, 763 P.2d at 577

(“A reasonable belief implies both an honest belief and the existence of facts which would persuade a reasonable person to that belief.” ); Kelly, 478 A.2d at 374 (“Honesty alone . . . does

“the term used to describe this condition could be no more inflammatory than its symptoms,

not suffice. A defendant claiming the privilege of self-defense must also establish that her

regarding BWS where a woman shot her live-in boyfriend while he was sitting in a chair after

defendant’s belief that the use of deadly force was necessary must have created such a belief in

557, 559 (quoting Dr. Matilda Rice) (reversing a woman’s conviction of first degree

334 Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 16 (quoting State v. Griffiths, 610 P.2d 522, 524 (Idaho 1980),

and far less than its causes”); Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 359, 362 (allowing expert testimony

suffering from ten years of physical and psychological abuse); Emick, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 554,

manslaughter in the shooting death of her sleeping boyfriend, who had been “physically abus-

belief in the necessity to use force was reasonable”); &orman, 378 S.E.2d at 13-16 (stating that

the mind of “a person of ordinary firmness”).

rev’d on other grounds, State v. LePage, 630 P.2d 674, 683, 692 (Idaho 1981)). The Humphrey

ing her for the past year and a half” and admitting expert testimony that she “displayed the

court further explained that “’[j]ustification does not depend upon the existence of actual dan-

her situation was at ‘the worst end of stage 3’”); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 19 (N.C.

reasonable person would be placed in fear for his safety and that the defendant acted out of that

classic signs of the battered wife syndrome, a multi-stage form of ‘familial disease’ and that
1989) (admitting expert testimony regarding BWS but affirming the voluntary manslaughter

ger but rather depends upon appearances; it is sufficient that the circumstances be such that a

fear.” Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 14 (quoting People v. Clark, 181 Cal. Rptr. 682, 686 (Cal. App. 3

conviction of a battered woman who shot her husband to death to prevent future abuse);

Dist. 1982)). Even if the defendant is mistaken in his assessment of the circumstances, “he is

manslaughter conviction of a battered wife who stabbed her husband to death): Bechtel, 840

Thus, the “objective component is not measured by an abstract standard of reasonableness but

ing a woman’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter and finding that the trial court erred in

14. To quote U.S. Supreme Court Justice Holmes, “Detached reflection cannot be demanded

ing the impact of expert testimony in criminal trials, the researchers concluded that such evi-

(reversing the second degree murder conviction where defendant shot a man who had twice

Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d at 819 (admitting expert testimony regarding BWS and reversing the

P.2d at 4-6, 8 (admitting expert testimony regarding BWS); Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 972 (overturn326 Id. (observing that after interviewing judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys concern-

dence has “increased recognition of the broader problem of domestic violence and that its

introduction can assist judges and juries to better understand the issues and/or dispel myths and
stereotypes related to battered women”). Id.
327

See, e.g., Davis v. State, 527 So.2d 962, 963 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that the

trial court erred in admitting “validating” testimony from a clinical psychologist that, according
to his validity scale, a fourteen-year-old abused child was “being frank” in her testimony that

she was molested by her father and finding that the psychologist was “invading the province of
the jury”). In People v. Cruickshank, (citing a case involving the shooting of a sexually abu-

sive father by his seventeen-year-old daughter) the New York Supreme Court held that admit-

ting expert testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome immediately after the defendant testified
about prior sexual abuse by her father, would have been “improper bolstering testimony.”

People v. Cruickshank, 484 N.Y.S.2d 328, 335 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985). Recounting that the court
went on to state that it is “within the sole province of the jury to pass on credibility and, where
the purpose of the expert witness is to bolster the testimony of another witness by explaining
that his version of the facts is believable, such expert testimony is improper.” Id.; see also

Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 270 (Del. 1987) (reversing defendants first degree rape conviction involving his ten-year-old stepdaughter and, although admitting expert testimony in “the
area of intrafamilial child abuse,” noting that, to the extent that expert testimony regarding

abused children attempts to quantify the veracity of a particular witness it is unacceptable, as

was the case here where the “expert witness was permitted to evaluate the complainant’s credibility in terms of statistical probabilities”).

nevertheless entitled to the defense” if his mistake is reasonable. Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 14.

one based on the defendant’s perception of imminent harm or death.” Humphrey, 921 P.2d at

in the presence of an uplifted knife.” Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 342-343 (1921)

assaulted the defendant with a knife, had threatened that “the next time, one of them would go

off in a black box” and was coming toward defendant with a knife on the night he was killed).
335 Smullen, 844 A.2d at 447-448.

336 See, e.g., Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 974 (admitting expert testimony “to assist the trier of fact
in determining whether the defendant acted out of an honest belief that she was in imminent
danger of death or great bodily harm and that the use of such force was her only means of

escape”); Hawthorne, 408 So. 2d at 807 (admitting expert testimony solely to help the jury
determine whether the defendant honestly believed she was in imminent danger).
337

Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d at 817; see also Witt, 892 P.2d at 138 (finding that expert testimo-

ny regarding BWS is not admissible on the ultimate issue of the defendant’s state of mind at
the time the crime was committed).

338 Smullen, 844 A.2d at 443 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Mones, supra note 3, at

14). The Smullen court noted that, especially with adolescents, “a particularly disturbing char-

acteristic of these homicides”, referred to by the police as the “`overkill factor,’” is that the parent is rarely “killed with a single clean shot; most often the child will shoot, club, or stab the

parent numerous times.” See also MacLennan, 702 N.W. 2d at 227 (citing Clinical Psychiatrist
Dr. Michael Arambula (noting that “the attack will usually involve excessive force because the

child is unable to control his or her emotions”)); Paul A. Mones, Parricide: Opening A Window
Through The Defense Of Teens Who Kill, 7 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61, 63 (1995-1996).

Obviously, there are also numerous cases in which a battered woman kills her abusive spouse

or boyfriend in a non-confrontational setting. See, e.g., Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 359 (summariz-

328 United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973).

ing that a woman physically and psychologically for ten years shot her live-in boyfriend while

see also United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1985) (analyzing a case involving a

abused for eighteen months shot her sleeping boyfriend).

329 &emeth, 694 N.E.2d at 1336 (quoting Stowers, 690 N.E.2d at 883 (emphasis in original));
missionary, operating a crisis center, who molested the five year old son and seven year old

daughter of a woman who lived with him temporarily, the court reversed expert testimony that

“these particular children in this particular case could be believed” since the jury “in effect was
impermissibly being asked to accept an expert’s determination that these particular witnesses

were truthful”); State v. Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 265 (Ariz. 1986) (reversing a father’s conviction
of child molestation and sexual abuse involving his daughter, who he had been sexually

molesting since she was five years old and noting that “[p]sychologists and psychiatrists are
not, and do not claim to be, experts at discerning truth [since] [p]sychiatrists are trained to
accept facts provided by their patients not to act as judges of patients’ credibility”).

330 See, e.g., MacLennan, 702 N.W.2d at 236 (noting that experts may “testify about characteristics possessed by the defendant that are consistent with those found in someone suffering

from battered child syndrome” but “experts may not testify to the ultimate fact that the particu-

he was sitting in a chair); Emick, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 554 (describing how a woman physically
339 Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d at 817.

340 State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977) (landmark case containing the first judicial

recognition of a subjective standard of self-defense for battered women on trial for killing their
abusers). In Wanrow, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that a battered woman defendant

“is entitled to have the jury consider her actions in the light of her own perceptions of the situation.” Id. at 567; see also Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 360 (rejecting the purely objective standard
of reasonableness and embracing the subjective test, noting: “The standard for the evaluation
of the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief and conduct is not what the ordinary prudent
man would have believed.. . [but] rather whether the defendant’s subjective belief as to the

imminence and seriousness of the danger was reasonable”); Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 973 (“Ohio

has adopted a subjective test in determining whether a particular defendant properly acted in
self-defense); Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d at 817-818 (affirming use of a subjective standard and

lar defendant suffers from battered child syndrome” thus, preserving the court’s “interest in

noting that “the finder of fact must view the circumstances from the standpoint of the accused

defendant suffers from battered child syndrome, and does not allow that role to be usurped by

belief that the use of force is necessary to protect himself from imminent harm”).

allowing the jury to serve as fact finders, with the role of determining whether a particular
experts”).

331 Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 13 (Brown, J., concurring) (quoting CAL. PENAL. CODE § 197

to determine if they are sufficient to create in the accused’s mind an honest and reasonable
341 Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d at 817 (emphasis in original).
342 Id. at 818 (citations omitted).

(West 2007)).

343 Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d at 9; see also Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 10-11 (noting that “evidence

333 LaFave & Scott, supra note 157, at 58; see also Langley v. State, 373 So. 2d 1267, 1272

jective existence, of defendant’s belief in the need to defend, and, to the extent it is relevant,

332 Id. at 13-14 (quoting Aris, 264 Cal.Rptr. at 175).

(Ala. Crim. App. 1979) (affirming a woman’s second degree murder conviction in the death of
her husband, the court held that the husband’s “previous violence, real or threatened, will not

excuse an intentional homicide” rather, the “conduct of the victim that would justify the exercise of the right of self-defense must be such as would manifest to the mind of a reasonable

101

of battered woman’s syndrome is generally relevant to the reasonableness, as well as the subthe jury may consider it in deciding both questions”); Stewart, 763 P.2d at 577 (noting that

BWS was “relevant to a determination of the reasonableness of defendant’s perception of danger” and acquitting an abused wife of first degree murder of her sleeping husband, based on a
“really grave lethal situation”); Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 11-12 (noting that Oklahoma’s “standard

Spring 2009

[of reasonableness] is a hybrid, combining both the objective and subjective standards” since

which assist the court in determining the reasonableness of a defendant’s fear of death or seri-

the reasonableness of [the defendant’s] belief, i.e., subjective [and] also requires the defen-

in the past”).

“the fact finder should assume the viewpoint and circumstances of the defendant in assessing
dant’s viewpoint to be that of a reasonable person, in similar circumstances and with the same

perceptions, i.e., objective”); Smullen, 844 A.2d at 251 (noting that the BCS “when applied in a
proper setting can. . . support both the subjective honesty of the defendant’s perception of

imminent harm and the objective reasonableness of such a perception”); Kelly, 478 A.2d at 364

(noting that expert testimony regarding BWS was admissible “as relevant to the honesty and
reasonableness of defendant’s belief that deadly force was necessary to protect her against

death or serious bodily harm.”); Gallegos, 719 P.2d at 1270 (commenting that “ours is a hybrid

ous injury at the time of a killing include the defendant’s familiarity with the victim’s behavior
359

Gallegos, 719 P.2d at (quoting Patricia Eber, The Battered Wife’s Dilemma: To Kill or to

be Killed, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 895 (1981) (noting that “[v]ictims of a battering relationship
live in a hopeless vacuum of ‘cumulative terror’”)).
360 Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 993 (Rose, J., dissenting).

361 Joelle Anne Moreno, Comment, Killing Daddy: Developing a Self-Defense Strategy for
the Abused Child, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1287 (1989).

362 Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d at 12 (Wuest, J., concurring in part an dissenting in part) (com-

test, combining both, the subjective and the objective standards: whether the defendant per-

menting that he didn’t “know anyone who claims he or she does” have such a license).

would have acted in self-defense). A hybrid standard has also been adopted by statute in

viction of second degree murder in the stabbing death of her live-in boyfriend, who had threat-

ceived an immediate threat and whether the reasonable person, in similar circumstances, also
Texas. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.36 (Vernon 1995) (“In a prosecution for

murder, if a defendant raises as a defense a justification . . . the defendant, in order to establish
the defendant’s reasonable belief that use of force or deadly force was immediately necessary,

shall be permitted to offer: (1) relevant evidence that the defendant had been the victim of acts
of family violence committed by the deceased . . .and (2) relevant expert testimony regarding
the condition of the mind of the defendant at the time of the offense, including those relevant

363

Janes, 850 P.2d at 505; see also, Nunn, 356 N.W.2d at 603-604 (affirming a wife’s con-

ened to kill her on the day he died, and noting that, despite expert testimony regarding BWS,

the jury could have properly concluded that her fear that she was in danger was not reasonable
since the “argument had ended several minutes before the stabbing [and] the victim was not
armed at the time”).

364 Janes, 850 P.2d at 505.

365 Id. This concern was part of the reason why the Wyoming Supreme Court applied an

facts and circumstances relating to family violence that are the basis of the expert’s opinion”).

objective standard in Jahnke. In that case, sixteen year old Richard Jahnke had been physically

355

tion, his father left the house stating, “I don’t know how but I’m going to get rid of you”. Id.

344

Richardson, 525 N.W.2d at 380.

356

Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d at 818. Dispelling any possible confusion on the part of a jury,

Id. at 382.

the court, if requested by the prosecuting attorney, might want to follow the suggestion of the
California Supreme Court in Humphrey and clarify that:

in assessing reasonableness, the question is whether a reasonable person in the

defendant’s circumstances would have perceived a threat of imminent injury or

death, and not whether killing the abuser was reasonable in the sense of being an
understandable response to ongoing abuse; and that, therefore, in making that

assessment, the jury may not consider evidence merely showing that an abused

person’s use of force against the abuser is understandable….The ultimate judgment of reasonableness is solely for the jury.

Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 10 (noting the “[e]vidence merely showing that a person’s use of deadly
force is scientifically explainable or empirically common does not, in itself, show it was objectively reasonable”).
347

348

Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d at 9.

Allery, 682 P.2d at 314-316 (noting that to “effectively present the situation perceived by

the defendant, and the reasonableness of her fear, the defense has the option to explain her feelings to enable the jury to overcome the stereotyped impressions about women who remain in

abused since the age of two by his father. Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 995. Following a violent alterca-

at 995. Claiming that he subjectively feared for his life, the abused teenager set up several

“backup” guns in the house and then waited in the garage for his father’s return. Id. When his
father entered the garage, Richard shot him four times with a shotgun. Id. At trial, Richard

claimed self-defense in the murder of his father, but was convicted of voluntary manslaughter.

Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 994. On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s verdict and stated: “It is difficult enough to justify capital punishment as an appropriate response
of society to criminal acts even after the circumstances have been carefully evaluated by a

number of people. To permit capital punishment to be imposed upon the subjective conclusion

of the individual that prior acts and conduct of the deceased justified the killing would amount
to a leap into the abyss of anarchy.” Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 977.

366 Smith, supra note 19, at 159; see also Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 997 (noting that any claim of a
defense of special justification allowing victims of abuse to kill abusers is “antithetical to the

mores of modern civilized society”); &orman, 378 S.E.2d at 13-15 (stating that “[t]he law does

not sanction the use of deadly force to repel simple assaults”).

367 &orman, 378 S.E.2d at 13 (reiterating the court’s holding which states that the defendant´s sense of self-preservation is what drives a homicidal response to domestic abuse.)
368 Id.

abusive relationships”).

369 &orman, 378 S.E.2d at 10.

350

Id. at 504 (quoting Wanrow, 559 P.2d at 563).

371 Id.

Id.

Rptr. at 179 (commenting that applying this concept can be difficult because of “our sympathy

349

Janes, 850 P.2d at 504.

351

Id.

352

353

Id. at 505.

354 Scobey, supra note 150, at 181.

355 In many cases, if a purely objective standard were applied, the expert testimony would be
nullified since battering victims frequently do not kill their batterers at a time when there

appeared to be a need for self defense. Id. This is in spite of the fact that actions taken in self-

defense by a victim of domestic abuse syndrome may be quite reasonable even though “the traditional elements are not obvious or apparent.” Id.

356 Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 15 (Brown, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion in

Humphrey, Justice Brown (recognizing a “clear nexus between the phenomenon of hypervigilance and the objective component of self-defense, i.e., reasonable fear of imminent injury or

death and the perceived need to react with the speed and force used”). Id. (Brown, J., concur-

ring). Justice Brown pointed out that, “[u]nder settled principles, if the victim’s threats caused
the defendant ‘to fear greater peril than she would have had otherwise, [the jury may] take

such facts into consideration in determining whether defendant acted in a manner which a rea-

370 Id.

372 Stewart, 243 Kan. at 640, 648-649, 763 P.2d at 575, 579, 583; see also Aris, 264 Cal.

for the plight of a battered woman and disgust for the batterer”; however, “it is fundamental to
our concept of law that there be no discrimination against sinners and saints solely on moral
grounds”).
373

Stewart, 763 P.2d at 574,

375

Id. at 575.

374

376

377

Id. 579.

Id. at 574.

&orman, 378 S.E.2d at 13.

378 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 675-676 (5th ed. 1979) (defining “immediate” as “pre-

sent; at once; without delay; not deferred by any interval of time. In this sense, the word, without any very precise signification, denotes that action is or must be taken either instantly or

without any considerable loss of time”). The Law Dictionary defines “imminent” as “near at
hand; mediate rather than immediate; close rather than touching; impending; on the point of

happening; threatening; menacing; perilous” and “imminent danger.” Id. In relation to homi-

sonable person would act in protecting his or her own life or bodily safety.’” Id. (quoting

cide in self-defense, the Law Dictionary defines “imminent” as meaning “immediate danger,

death of her estranged husband due to the trial court’s error in refusing defendant’s request for

of others or the protection of the law. Or, as otherwise defined, such an appearance of threat-

Moore, 275 P.2d at 499 (reversing an abused wife’s manslaughter conviction in the shooting

an instruction “on the influence of antecedent threats” on the “vital matter of self defense”)).

Justice Brown concluded that when “antecedent threats have accompanied a recurring cycle of
escalating abuse, their relevance to the reasonableness of the defendant’s fear of imminent and
more serious violence is manifest.” Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 15 (Brown, J. concurring).
357

358

Janes, 850 P.2d at 504-505 (quoting Wanrow, 559 P.2d at 552).

Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 1012 (Rose, J., dissenting); see also Stonehouse, 555 A.2d at 781

(noting that where “there has been physical abuse over a long period of time, the circumstances
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such as must be instantly met, such as cannot be guarded against by calling for the assistance

ened and impending injury as would put a reasonable and prudent man to his instant defense.”
Id.

379 See, e.g., Whipple v. State, 523 N.E.2d 1363, 1367 (Ind. 1988) (upholding the conviction

of seventeen year old Dale Whipple for the murder of his non-threatening mother and sleeping
father, despite the fact that the parents had subjected both children to physical and mental

abuse throughout their lives, because any “threat of harm to Dale or his sister was too temporally remote to be `imminent’ for the purpose of self-defense or defense of others”); see also

102

Aris, 215 Cal.App.3d at 1184 (holding that a battered woman did not face immediate peril

264 Cal. Rptr. at 167); see also Allery, 682 P.2d 313 (holding that expert testimony regarding

fied); Stewart, 763 P.2d at 572 (finding self-defense instruction inappropriate because there was

ing”).

when she shot her sleeping husband and therefore the self-defense instruction was not justinothing leading the battered wife to conclude that she would “immediately” suffer death or

great bodily injury at the time that she killed her sleeping husband despite her husband’s physical and sexual abuse of her and of her twelve-year-old daughter); Kelly, 97 N.J. at 197 (stating
in the context of a battered wife that force must be “immediately necessary” to justify self

defense); &orman, 324 N.C. at 255 (rejecting self-defense instruction because the battered

woman was not faced with instantaneous choice of killing or being killed when she shot her

sleeping husband in the back of the head after years of abuse); Commonwealth v. Grove, 526
A.2d 369, 371, 373 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (noting that the defendant-wife attempted “to cloud
this issue with a semantical smokescreen regarding the alleged differences between the time

frames encompassed by the terms” and indicating that, although the husband’s twenty-two year
“history of spousal abuse is certainly a factor to be considered in determining whether an

BWS “is admissible to show the defendant’s fear of imminent danger at the time of the shoot385 Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 15 (Brown, J., concurring); see also Gallegos, 719 P.2d at 1271

(explaining that “remarks or gestures which are merely offensive or perhaps even meaningless

to the general public may be understood by the abused individual as an affirmation of impending physical abuse”).

386 See, e.g., Stewart, 763 P.2d at 582 (allowing expert testimony regarding BWS “to prove

the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief she was in imminent danger”); Koss, 551 N.E.2d at
973 (holding that “[e]xpert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome can be admitted
to help the jury…determine whether the defendant had reasonable grounds for an honest belief
that she was in imminent danger when considering the issue of self-defense”).
387 Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 15 (quoting Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 362.)

388 See, e.g., Gallegos, 719 P.2d at 1274 (holding that an abused wife who shot and stabbed

accused’s alleged fear of imminent death or serious bodily injury is genuine and reasonable, it

her battering husband while he was lying in bed was entitled to an instruction on self-defense);

the present occasion and finding that the victim was not threatening in any manner; rather, it is

imminent not immediate threat, a self-defense instruction was required where a battered

does not alter the requirement that the threat of death or serious bodily injury be imminent on
undisputed that he was drunk and asleep” when his wife shot him in the back, “tied his legs,
poured gasoline about his body and ignited it”); Leaphart, 673 S.W.2d at 872-873 (quoting

Draper v. State, 63 Tenn. 246, 251 (1984) (noting that “[t]o make a claim of self-defense . . .
the accused must establish that danger of death or serious bodily harm was ‘imminent and

impending, manifested by some words or overt acts at the time clearly indicative of a present

Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d at 819 (noting that since North Dakota’s self defense statute requires
woman stabbed to death her sleeping husband); Allery, 682 P.2d at 316 (finding that a self-

defense instruction was proper when a battered wife shot her husband while he was lying on
the couch, even though no violent act immediately preceded the shooting).
389 Hundley, 693 P.2d at 475.

390 Id.

purpose to do injury’” and holding that there was no error in denying a self-defense instruction

391 Id.

to death with a baseball bat and then “helped them stuff [her husband’s] bloody corpse into the

393 Id.

to a battered woman who watched two men she had hired while they beat her abusive husband
trunk of his red MG automobile”); Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 1009 (refusing self-defense instruction

because there was no evidence that Richard Jahnke was “under either actual or threatened

assault by his father” at the time Richard shot him as his father entered the garage). As the

392 Id. at 476.

394 Id.

395 Id.

396 Id.

California Appellate Court noted in Aris: “Any civilized system of law recognizes the supreme

397 Id.

sity.” Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1188. Abusers are “entitled to the same protection of their

399 Id. at 467-469 (holding that the entire ten year history of abuse of the defendant by her

value of human life, and excuses or justifies its taking only in cases of apparent absolute neceslives by the law afforded to everyone.” Id. at 1189. For example, in &orman, the North

Carolina Supreme Court refused to expand the time frame in a case where a woman had suf-

fered years of abuse at the hands of her husband. &orman, 378 S.E.2d at 9-11. On the day of

398 Id. at 479.

husband was relevant in determining whether she reasonably feared abuse from her husband
and how imminent the danger was).
400 Id. at 467-469.

the homicide, the husband beat his wife all day and then threatened to kill her if she left him.

401 Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 8.

Id. In upholding the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury regarding self-defense, the court

403 Id. at 12, fn. 12 (quoting Eber, supra note 359, at 895).

instantaneous choice between killing her husband or being killed or seriously injured.” Id.

405 Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 12 (emphasis in original).

dant’s husband physically, sexually and psychologically abused both the defendant and her 12

407 Id.

ened his wife and sexually abused her. Id. That night, the defendant shot him in the head as

Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 121, 141 (1985) (“[R]epeated abuse can so heighten a bat-

Id. That night, the wife shot her husband once in the chest and twice in the head as he slept.
concluded that there was no “immediate danger” and the defendant “was not faced with an

The Kansas Supreme Court in Stewart, reached a similar conclusion in a case where the defenyear old daughter. Stewart, 763 P.2d at 577-78. On the day of the murder, the husband threathe slept. Id. In concluding that the battered woman was not entitled to a self defense instruction, the court in Stewart commented:

[I]n order to instruct a jury on self-defense, there must be some showing of an

imminent threat or a confrontational circumstance involving an overt act by the

aggressor. There is no exception to this requirement where the defendant has suffered long-term domestic abuse where the victim is the abuser. In such cases, the

402 Id.

404 Richardson, 525 N.W.2d at 382.

406 Janes, 850 P.2d at 506.

408 Phyllis Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women who Kill Men in Self-

tered woman’s fear and her awareness of her husband’s physical capabilities that she considers
him as dangerous asleep as awake, as dangerous before an attack as during one.”).
409 Scobey, supra note 150, at 183.
410 Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 12.
411 Id. at 11-12.

412 Id. at 12 (citing LaFave & Scott, supra note 107, at 58).

issue is not whether the defendant believes homicide is the solution to past or

413 Id.; see also Hundley, 693 P.2d at 479 (applying a similar analogy, stating that “[b]attered

the killing were sufficient to create a reasonable belief in the defendant that the

blance to that of a hostage or a prisoner of war”).

future problems with the batterer, but rather whether circumstances surrounding
use of deadly force was necessary. . . . A battered woman cannot reasonably fear
life-threatening danger from her sleeping spouse. Id.

381 Langley, 373 So.2d 1271.

382 Id. As the Pennsylvania Court of Appeal held in a case in which an abused wife killed

her abusive husband as he lay sleeping: “Assuming that [the wife] was genuinely and reason-

women are terror-stricken people whose mental state is distorted and bears a marked resem-

414 Gallegos, 719 P.2d at 1271 (quoting Eber, supra note 364, at 320 (drawing similarities

between the victims of a hostage situation and the victims of domestic abuse)).
415 Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 1011.

416 Hundley, 693 P.2d at 479 (explaining the mental state of victims of abuse).

ably afraid of her husband, the fact remains that whatever danger he presented was not imminent on the present occasion as he lay sleeping.” Grove, 526 A.2d at 373 (emphasis in origi-

nal).

383 Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 15 (Brown, J., concurring) (citing Kit Kinports, Defending

Battered Women’s Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. L. REV. 393, 423-424 (1988) (citations omit-

ted)). Justice Brown further pointed out a battered woman is also “‘attuned to her abuser’s pattern of attacks, she learns to recognize subtle gestures or threats that distinguish the severity of
attacks and that lead her to believe a particular attack will seriously threaten her survival.’”

Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 16 (Brown, J., concurring) (quoting Developments in the Law—Legal
Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1582 (1993) (citation omitted)).
384

103

Id. at 16 (Brown, J., concurring) (quoting Ewing, supra note 19, at 55, and citing Aris,
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